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Southeast Asia Report



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23 DECEMBER 1986

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BURMA

BRIEFS

DEATH OF MON REBEL LEADER—Leader of the anti-Rangoon Mon minority rebels, Nai Tala Mon, died of asthma two months ago on the Burmese-Thai border opposite the western province of Kanchanaburi, an informed source said yesterday. The source told THE NATION that Nai Tala Mon, who was secretary general of the Mon National Liberation Army (MNLA) and its political arm the New Mon State Party (NMSP), had suffered from malaria and asthma for a long time before his death on September 24. Nai Tala Mon was admitted to Sangkhlaburi District Hospital in Kanchanaburi, but due to the seriousness of his condition, doctors failed to keep him alive, according to the source. [Excerpt] [Bangkok THE NATION in English 22 Nov 86 p 5 BK] /6662

CSO: 4200/184

BRIEFS

STAND ON HERZOG VISIT SUPPORTED--The Indonesian Ulemas Council [MUI] fully supports the government's stand regretting the presence of Israeli President Hayim Herzog in Singapore, which will not be beneficial to ASEAN solidarity. The MUI statement was issued in Jakarta this afternoon at the end of its plenary executive meeting, which started yesterday. Munawir Syadzali, chairman of the MUI Advisory Council, told newsmen that the MUI also supports the Indonesian Government's consistent policy on the Middle East issue, supporting the Palestinian people's rights and calling for Israeli withdrawal from occupied Arab territories. Earlier, Lukman Harun and Abdul Rahman Wahid, leaders of Indonesia's two largest Islamic mass organizations--Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama--supported the government's stand regretting the Israeli president's visit to Singapore from today to 20 November 1986. With the Israeli president's visit, Indonesia regards Singapore as being insensitive to the position of ASEAN countries on relations with Israel. [Text] [Jakarta Domestic Service in Indonesian 1500 GMT 18 Nov 86] /9604

NEW MILITARY ACADEMY COMMANDANT--Armed Forces Commander General Murdani installed Rear Admiral Sugiatmo as new commandant of the Armed Forces Academy, replacing Lieutenant General Kahpi Suriadireja, at a ceremony in Jakarta on 13 November. [Summary] [Jakarta KOMPAS in Indonesian 15 Nov 86 p 12] /9604

ILLEGAL ALIENS DEPORTED--The Directorate General of Immigration in October deported 26 alines--22 for illegal stay and 4 for illegal entry. Two of the aliens were from the Netherlands, six from Malaysia, two from Singapore, four from Taiwan, and one each from the FRG, France, Saudi Arabia, Hong Kong, South Korea, the United States, Belgium, and Tanzania. [Summary] [Jakarta KOMPAS in Indonesian 15 Nov 86 p 12] /9604

TRANSMIGRATION FROM EAST JAVA--Since the implementation of the First 5-Year Development Plan [Repelita] up to October 1986 of the Fourth Repelita, the East Java province had resettled a total of 339,170 transmigrant families or 1,121,547 persons to various transmigration locations outside Java. The chief of the Transmigration Department's Public Relations Division disclosed to newsmen in Jakarta on 24 November that during the Fourth Repelita alone, East Java has resettled 118,035 transmigrant families or 228,866 persons. [Summary] [Jakarta Domestic Service in Indonesian 2300 GMT 24 Nov 86] /9604

SUPPORT FOR PALESTINE CAUSE REAFFIRMED--Foreign Minister Mokhtar Kusumaatmaja has reaffirmed that Indonesia consistently supports the Palestinian people's struggle to establish their own state in accordance with the principle of self-determination. Speaking at his weekly press conference in Jakarta this afternoon, Minister Mokhtar went on to say that Indonesia recognizes the PLO as the sole representative of the Palestinian people. Indonesia also supports the call for the convening of an international conference on Palestine in an effort to settle the Palestine issue. [Excerpts] [Jakarta Domestic Service in Indonesian 1200 GMT 28 Nov 86 BK]

MOKHTAR ON PHILIPPINE SITUATION--The Indonesian foreign minister, Mokhtar Kusumaatmaja, has expressed the hope that the latest development in the Philippines would lead to a peaceful solution to the recent political turbulence. It is hard to say whether the current situation in that country has improved or achieved any progress, the minister said in Denpasar yesterday. According to the minister, the situation in the Philippines constituted an internal affair. Therefore, we should wait for further developments, he added. Earlier, Minister Mokhtar said that the Indonesian and other Southeast Asian nations were peace-loving people, which they had proved when they warmly welcomed the first Earth Run peace torch organized by the United Nations. Foreign Minister Mokhtar Kusumaatmaja was in Bali to see off the peace torch to be flown to Sydney, Australia. [Text] [Jakarta International Service in English 0800 GMT 26 Nov 86 BK] /12624

TEMPO APPEARS 1 DAY LATE--Jakarta, 27 Nov (AFP)--This week's edition of Indonesia's leading weekly, TEMPO, appeared Thursday -- a day later than usual. A TEMPO spokesman said Wednesday the delay was due to technical problems, but another source at the weekly's office said the distribution of this week's edition had had to be delayed because a reader's letter it carried concerning one of President Suharto's sons had had to be dropped. Distribution of the Hong Kong-based daily THE ASIAN WALL STREET JOURNAL resumed in Indonesia Thursday. The three previous issues were banned because the newspaper carried an article detailing monopolies allegedly held by Mr Suharto's family and associates. [Text] [Hong Kong AFP in English 1017 GMT 27 Nov 86 BK] /12624

TRANSMIGRATION TO SOUTH SULAWESI--A total of 18,509 transmigrant families or 60,832 persons have been resettled in South Sulawesi province since the time before the first 5-year development plan was launched. The Public Relations Division of the Transmigration Department announced in Jakarta that during the 1986-87 fiscal year, a total of 1,044 transmigrant families, out of the targeted 1,300 families, have been resettled in that province. [Summary] [Jakarta Domestic Service in Indonesian 2300 GMT 27 Nov 86 BK] /12624

CSO: 4200/185

BRIEFS

OPPOSITION BID AGAINST MAHATHIR REJECTED--The Kuala Lumpur High Court today rejected opposition leader Lim Kit Siang's application order against Prime Minister Datuk Sri Dr Mahathir Mohamed for contempt of court. This is a follow-up of a statement which was made to the 24 November U.S. TIME magazine which it published. Justice Datuk Harun Hashim, when rejecting the application order, said the statement concerning the matter is only the prime minister's personal views. The statement was not meant to bring disrespect to the court and judges should be cautious when facing similar situations. He said according to the current system the prime minister cannot be excluded from what he said to the general public and the newspapers. [Text] [Kuala Lumpur Service in Malay 1230 GMT 28 Nov 86 BK] /12232

CSO: 4213/24

EDITORIAL ASSAILS U.S. POLITICAL INTERVENTION

HK011549 Manila THE MANILA EVENING POST in English 28 Nov 86 p 4

[Editorial: "The American Hand"]

[Text] The ambassador protests too much--we mean the outgoing American Ambassador to the Philippines, Stephen Bosworth, who has to his credit an unparalleled record of destabilization of our government and who, we thought, had already finished his tour of duty in the Philippines after the EDSA [Efifanio de los Santos Avenue] happening. Apparently, he still has one item in the American agenda to preside over in the country.

His protestations of innocence notwithstanding, Ambassador Bosworth is one man very few Filipinos can believe without fearing for their lives. Many believe that the U.S. once again played a role in the recent political events here. Not only has the U.S. affirmed its "clear and unequivocal support" for the Aquino government; it also made some crucial moves against Minister Enrile at a time when he was proving to be a thorn in Cory's side.

For instance, there was that deliberate leak to the SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS of an investigation being conducted by the U.S. Justice Department about some arms deal allegedly involving Mr Enrile. This was followed by an influx of American members of the intelligence sector and a security community into Manila. Their credentials were quite impressive.

They included Dr Ray Cline, former CIA deputy director, now connected with the Reagan think tank, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Georgetown University; Gen John Singlaub, a shadowy officer involved in the arms support for the Nicaragua Contras; and some unnamed State and Defense officials.

There are also unconfirmed reports that the Reagan troubleshooter, Philip Habib, (whom a coup always follows) was recently in Manila, entering through Clark Field. Surely, Mr Habib was not here for the weather.

In other words, the denials of Mr Bosworth should not be taken at its face value. Mr Reagan is in deep trouble for his encouragement of "Project Mercury,"

a National Security Council operation involving arms shipments to both Iran and Nicaragua. That America interferes in the affairs of other countries cannot be denied by American officials. The latest is the Iranian blunder.

Despite the protestations of Mr Bosworth, one suspects a heavy, treacherous American hand in our political life today. We can wish that it will soon be exposed like "Project Mercury."

The American image certainly needs some refurbishing.

/6662

CSO: 4200/188

COLUMNIST HITS BASES EFFECT ON CEASE-FIRE

HK011311 Manila THE SUNDAY TIMES in English 30 Nov 86 p 4

["The Constitution and You" column by Alejandro Lichauco: "Cease-fire and the Bases"]

[Text] The most critical item in the coming negotiations for a "comprehensive political settlement" of the insurgency problem is unquestionably the bases.

Messrs Zumel and Ocampo defined the position of the NDF when they said that "The NDF has always been known to have demanded the abrogation of the U.S. military bases agreement," adding that "the issue would be raised in subsequent talks with the government and we will find out if we can reconcile our positions."

If agreement is reached on this point, a giant step towards the permanent resolution of insurgency shall have been taken, and there is no reason why other areas of disagreement cannot be similarly resolved.

It is essential therefore that agreement on the bases question be reached, and public opinion should mobilize towards this end.

This is an issue which, like the parity question, has been a major source of national disunion, and as negotiations between the government and the rebels begin, the entire nation should recall and ponder the words and wisdom of the late Claro M. Recto, president of the 1935 Constitutional Convention, who devoted the last decade of his memorable life to a crusade for the abrogation of the military bases.

There were many more, of course; and one must begin with no less than Commonwealth President Manuel Luis Quezon who staked his political fortune on the bases issue. He defied the first Philippine Independence Bill because it provided for the retention of the bases, and he won out, firmly establishing that, from the start, the Filipino people wanted their independence without bases.

From Quezon and Recto, we recall public personalities no less patriotic and nationalistic: The aging Lorenzo Tanada, the ill-stricken Jose W. Diokno,

the preeminent jurist J.B.L. Reyes and the late J. Antonio Araneta of the Civil Liberties Union. The late Nonoy Aquino is also known to have stated, before a U.S. Congressional committee, that the bases must eventually go.

And there are of course the thousands of young men and women who, during martial law, fled to the hills to join the rebel cause, not because they were communists, but simply because they were nationalists. Many of them perished in the struggle.

Can there then be a settlement on the bases question?

Of course there can. There must be, if national unity is to be achieved. An effective settlement on the bases won't necessarily ensure national unity, although the promise of unity becomes that much more reachable and imminent if settlement were reached. But we can be sure that without a settlement on the bases, national unity is impossible, and the ceasefire breaks down.

What form would such a settlement take?

It would take the form of a definite deadline beyond which the bases won't be extended.

As a starting position, the NDF would most likely press for the termination of the bases by 1991, and for a firm commitment from the Aquino government to that effect.

The Aquino government, on pressure from the Pentagon, will likely reject it outright. But then again it might not, and the government might agree to the termination of the bases by 1991 if that is what it would take to have peace, irrespective of what Pentagon might say.

Failing in that, both sides might agree to a compromise deadline beyond 1991, say between 1991 and the year 2000, giving the U.S. a period of time to phase out.

The point is that anything is now possible, and since anything is now possible, the question is would the U.S. allow the Aquino government and the NDF to pursue discussion on this crucial question, or implement what they agree on?

We have not necessarily seen the end of destabilization, and the crisis of the presidency is far from over.

On account of the bases.

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CSO: 4200/188

PHILIPPINES

ENRILE OUSTER SEEN AS 'FINAL PASSING' OF MARCOS ERA

HK011520 Manila THE MANILA CHRONICLE in English 29 Nov 86 pp 1, 2

["Analysis" column by Editor in Chief Amando Doronila: "The Final Passing of Marcos Era"]

[Text] Defense Minister Juan Ponce Enrile yesterday handed over power to retired Lt Gen Rafael Ilete in a bloodless changing of the guard marked by military ceremonies at Camp Aguinaldo.

The turnover dramatized the final passing of the Marcos era and the consolidation of President Aquino's authority over the most strategic organ of state power—the Defense Ministry.

It brought down the curtains on 15 years of Enrile's stewardship of the nation's security under deposed President Marcos, the highlight of which was his having been his chief martial law administrator, and on Enrile's bureaucratic career.

It also established a new leadership in the Defense Ministry under General Ilete and the Chief of Staff, Gen Fidel Ramos, both of whom have demonstrated their adherence to the concept of the supremacy of Constitutional civilian authority over the military. It is more than symbolic that the new defense chief, General Ilete, had a contrasting career to that of Enrile in the sense that the general opposed the imposition of martial law in 1972.

With the turnover, a democratic orientation has been reinforced as the official creed of the military now firmly aligned behind the Ilete Ramos tandem and the Aquino Government.

The fact that only a week ago, the government was teetering on the edge of civil war, underscores the peaceful process of transition that has overcome the series of crises that has rocked the government since the relatively bloodless revolution of February.

At the turnover ceremony, Enrile's security aides, who only a week ago were portraits of arrogance and boastfulness, were models of humility and the meekness of the vanquished.

The failed coup plan at the weekend was the end of the rope for the conspiratorial activities of the Defense Ministry's officers' clique who had tried to destabilize the government.

Enrile's career has now come full circle. He entered the public service in the service of Marcos and was a leading member of Marcos' political machine, the Kilusang Bagong Lipunan (KBL), which was the regime's instrument for a virtually one-party state. His defection from the regime last February helped overthrow Marcos, but it was not a clean break from the past.

He was incorporated into the successor government following the Marcos overthrow as defense minister, but one of his feet was planted on the Aquino government, the other on the Marcos loyalist camp. In his sustained attack on the Aquino government, he courted the remnants of the Marcos constituency in the KBL and was accepted by most of them as the heir to the Marcos authoritarian tradition. In the final but futile bid to topple the Aquino government last weekened, to which Enrile's men are linked, it was not terribly surprising that the KBL members were recruited to form part of the conspiracy to seize and reconvene the Batasang Pambansa, Marcos' instrument to legitimize political control.

Enrile did not quite escape the curse of his past with Marcos. In the end, he reintegrated with the KBL which became the last base for a political constituency after his own power base in the defense establishment had been eroded by General Ramos.

It was indeed very revealing that while the turnover ceremony was taking place at Camp Aguinaldo, a pitiful band of loyalist stragglers was demonstrating at the gates of the camp, demanding the return of Enrile to the ministry.

But the events of the past week have rapidly bypassed the loyalists and made them irrelevant, if not public nuisances.

Stripped of a power base within the defense establishment, Enrile has now decided to employ his considerable political talents in the arena of competitive politics. He has a future in the conservative side of politics; the conservative stream is in search of a strong leader. Enrile, more than his ideological bedfellow, Vice President Salvador Laurel, is in a stronger and more logical position to capture the conservative leadership and constituency.

This ideological definition is healthy for competitive plural politics. But Enrile must now operate under the rules set out by Cory Aquino and under her own terms. With the nation moving towards the establishment of Constitutional democracy, Enrile enters a new arena in which guns and conspiratorial, not to mention romantic, colonels are not the arbiters for winning power. The era of fantasizing has ended with Enrile's departure

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CSO: 4260/188

PAPER LAUDS AQUINO'S STRENGTH DURING CRISIS

HK011341 Manila THE MANILA CHRONICLE in English 30 Nov 86 pp 1, 3

["Analysis" column by editor-in-chief Amando Doronila: "An 'Iron Maiden' Rises From Crisis"]

[Text] President Aquino has emerged after the crisis of the past several weeks a stronger Chief Executive than she was at the installation of her government on 25 February.

She has, in just one week, dismissed her rebellious Defense Minister, Juan Ponce Enrile, without a violent backlash from the military, her government has signed a ceasefire agreement with the National Democratic Front; and she has begun to shake up her Cabinet to prepare it for the big push towards economic recovery and social reform.

She has also revealed more fully that she has nerves of steel to make a stand on her political beliefs when events are pushing her to the wall. Indeed, if the crisis was the test of her leadership, it had produced from its crucible an "iron maiden" in Philippines politics.

It may truly be said that President Aquino has entered a new era of political consolidation in which there are now fewer obstacles to the task of establishing constitutional democratic institutions.

What has been ignored is that in a fundamental sense, it was the institution of the Philippine presidency that was at the center of the storm. It was undergoing a severe test at the time when the constitutional ground rules had not been established and the test was being aggravated by the fact that the incumbent was a politically inexperienced person who had sure instincts as an opposition leader but who had no sophistication in the art of governing.

What has been demonstrated by success of the government in turning the crisis into an opportunity for consolidation is that there is in the presidency a deep reservoir of resources that can be used to hold the nation together when tensions are tearing it apart.

Mrs Aquino acceded to the presidency under unique circumstances. She took office not only via the route of a popular uprising--not through a completed electoral process. She also began to govern without the traditional political institutions that have underpinned the presidency. had been available to her predecessors.

The absence of such institutions as a supportive legislature and a local government infrastructure, a popularly ratified Constitution and a political party system, made the presidency vulnerable to challenges to its authority and legitimacy. The presidency was fair game to all sorts of dissidence.

All administrations before that of Mrs Aquino had institutional support such that even when the government of deposed President Marcos became heavily dependent on a politicized military for its survival, he was able to impose the authority of the civilian leadership over the armed forces.

When the Aquino Government was on the verge of collapse in the face of the coup plot and the uncertainty of military support, there was only one recourse left for her to save her Government: assert the powers of the presidency that had been nurtured over the years by political tradition.

When crisis was looming, Mrs Aquino hesitated to draw on the powers of the presidency because she was aware that while she could officially summon the authority of the office, her orders could not be enforced without the support of the armed forces. This would have resulted in her Government collapsing like a house of cards.

Under siege, Mrs Aquino used these powers to dismiss Enrile and the moral authority invested in the office to persist in the policy of reconciliation with the Communist insurgents. To be sure, she had to give concessions to the military to win their support, especially on the cease-fire issue, but trade-offs are normal in politics.

In the end, it was the mystique of the presidency that swayed the support of the military in her showdown with the conspiracy associated with the forces loyal to Enrile.

Without discounting the personal popularity of President Aquino, it can be said that the inherent powers and moral authority of the presidency were decisive in holding the political center.

Even in the temporary absence of institutional support, the presidency is never in a vacuum. It has a deep tradition built on a popular base. If the president is popular, as Mrs Aquino is, then that base is available for mobilization in support of the presidency. And the perception that the president is popular is in itself a resource that deters challenges to the government.

Mrs Aquino's mistake is that she did not avail of this resource to reinforce hard decisions until the 11th hour. But when she invoked presidential

powers, especially as commander-in-chief of the armed forces, the magesterial decisions brought back images of a traditionally strong and interventionist presidency.

If the last crisis had taguth us a lesson, including President Aquino, it is that every Filipino respects and will obey a president who acts like a president.

Mrs Aquino has demonstrated her mettle as a leader in the opposition movement in the face of nearly impossible odds. She has reaffirmed that this will of steel has not abandoned her during the past crisis. Public confidnce in her Government's ability to survive eroded because she hesitated to assert that will.

Now that she has shown she is in charge, the new image of the "iron maiden" will have to be maintained. That is the only way to survive the road to transition to Constitutional democracy.

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CSO: 4200/188

EDITORIAL ON NEED TO DE-POLITICIZE MILITARY

HK011215 Manila PHILIPPINE DAILY INQUIRER in English 29 Nov 86 p 4

[Editorial: "De-Politicizing the Military"]

[Text] The military has definitely a kingsize headache posed by the "Ramboys," most of whom allegedly hatched "God Save the Queen." And the ball is in the hands of Defense Minister Rafael Ilete.

Newspapers and coffee shops note a groundswell of popular clamor for more drastic action against the putsch planners who, for a long time, had held the entire country in a climate of fear.

Ilete's efforts to sue for time only served to rouse suspicions of a possible whitewash, an accommodating gesture similar to that accorded the participants in the Manila Hotel tragic-comic caper. Many point to a distinction. The God Save the Queen plotters had taken their oath of loyalty to the Freedom Constitution. The former group did so only after they had been shepherded back to the fold after having explained lamely their participation as due to a foolish belief they were rushing to defend then Defense Minister Juan Ponce Enrile and AFP [Armed Forces of the Philippines] Chief of Staff Fidel V. Ramos.

The Manila Hotel aftermath created a furor. The fears articulated by those who opposed the kid-glove handling of the errant militarymen were validated by subsequent events. Thus, unless the plotters are pinpointed and meted the necessary disciplinary measures, it will be open season to similar adventures in the future. The decision on those involved in God Save the Queen will serve as a precedent.

Tragically, those involved in the alleged coup are among the most brilliant and promising officers of the AFP. But that precisely is an aggravating factor. In short, they reached and crafted a reasoned decision. That they were stifled does not mitigate the reported operationalization of the plan.

The military organization is anchored on discipline. Its survival depends on it. So with that of the entire nation. The November affair could just very

well accelerate the inroad into the military establishment of partisanship which the former regime had successfully managed to infuse into it.

The politicization of the AFP by the former regime resulted in promotions of political generals. Most of them lapsed into virtual paralysis last February when confronted by an equally politicized citizenry.

The professionals, sickened by the deterioration of the AFP into a private political army, opted to preserve the integrity of the armed forces. That sparked the EDSA [Epifanio de los Santos Avenue] revolt. Unfortunately, some of those who helped liberate the AFP from partisan politics themselves, succumbed to the temptation of political power.

However, they plunged into their enterprise with eyes open to the possible consequences of failure. Worse, their plan was aborted not only once, but several times. In short, the boom has to be lowered.

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CSO: 4200/188

PHILIPPINES

MILITARY CAUTIOUS OVER NDF COALITION DEMAND

HK011417 Manila MANILA BULLETIN in English 30 Nov 86 pp 1, 12

[Article by Jose de Vera]

[Text] Defense authorities said yesterday that the military has adopted a "wait and see attitude" on a reported demand by the National Democratic Front (NDF) for a "coalition" government.

Defense Minister Rafael M. Ilete and the general headquarters of the New Armed Forces of the Philippines (NAFP) in Camp Aguinaldo did not issue any comments on the report, preferring to wait for further developments and for a reaction from President Aquino.

Defense and military analysts said that if the report that Satur Ocampo, NDF negotiator, is working for the setting up of a coalition government in the Aquino administration, then resigned defense chief Juan Ponce Enrile was right in saying that the insurgents will not settle for anything less than a share in government power, or in the takeover of the entire government.

Some segments in Camp Aguinaldo, however, said that a coalition government is very remote as President Aquino herself has said that she will not allow a coalition with the rebels.

Camp Aguinaldo sources noted that last Thursday, Agriculture Minister Ramon Mitra Jr and Audit Commissioner Teofisto Guingona, both members of the government negotiating panel, conferred with now Defense Minister Ilete and other top officers of both the Ministry of Defense and the NAFP on two "tickish issues" prior to the signing of the 60-day ceasefire agreement which takes effect Dec. 10.

The conference followed a meeting between Guingona and Mitra and NDF negotiators Ocampo and Antonio Zumel.

The two issues discussed involved the continued implementation by the rebels of the "progressive tax system" and the cutoff of military assistance from the United States Government, particularly during the duration of the 60-day ceasefire.

A ranking NAFF officer, who requested anonymity, said the ceasefire agreement should not legitimize the existence of two parallel governments even for short periods of time because that would endanger not only the country's national security but also its sovereignty.

A ceasefire, this officer stressed, should not have the effect of ceding any portion of the country, including 18 percent of the countryside which the CPP [Communist Party of the Philippines]/NPA/NDF claim to have influence or control.

Authoritative military sources explained: "It is not the ceasefire agreement but the proposal for a comprehensive political settlement or coalition being sought by the NDP/ CPP/NPA which will put to test the political will and cohesion of the Aquino government, particularly the capability of the NAFF and its confidence in the present national leadership."

The sources said that based on the revised program of the NDF, the military foresees that the main demands which the CPP/NPA/NDF is likely to put forward in subsequent negotiations would be:

1. The removal of the U.S. military facilities.
2. A genuine land reform program intended to break up landed estates for distribution to their tillers.
3. The reorientation of the NAFF toward the goal of national democracy.
4. The removal from the country of multinationals.

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CSO: 4200/188

EDITORIAL ON SIGNIFICANCE OF CEASE-FIRE AGREEMENT

HK011522 Manila THE MANILA CHRONICLE in English 29 Nov 86 p 9

[Editorial: "The Cease-fire Agreement"]

[Text] With the signing of the cease-fire agreement, the cessation of hostilities between the government and the rebels takes effect on December 10. This is to give sufficient time for both the government and the NDF [National Democratic Front] to disseminate the terms of the agreement to all their forces in the field--on the part of the Government, this includes the different components of the Armed Forces, and on the side of the NDF, the CPP [Communist Party of the Philippines]-NPA. For as far as the cease-fire is concerned, it is the military arms of both parties that will be crucial in the observance of the details of the agreement.

An understanding of this issue is crucial, specially to the public. For between the signing of the agreement on 27 November and December 10, the date the cease-fire is to take effect, it is possible that there will be incidences of misunderstanding, or outright ignorance from either side and so, therefore, the possibility of open clashes is still there. These should not be occasion for recrimination or panic; it is a natural consequence of the two parties having been engaged in a state of belligerency for more than 17 years. It is expected, however, that such incidence of armed encounters will diminish. Hence, the necessity of continued good faith and sincerity on both sides in the interim period.

Meanwhile, cease-fire committees are expected to be constituted that will monitor the situation at the national and local levels.

After the effectivity date of the ceasefire, the agreement stipulates that all incidence of encounters or what properly now would be considered violations of the agreement, will be referred to the cease-fire committees consisting of third party representatives but with representation from both the government and the NDF sides. It shall be the function of the committees to determine responsibility of violations and to recommend appropriate action on the culpable parties based on the understanding that may later be formulated between the government and the NDF.

These particular aspects of the agreement is vital to an understanding of the cease-fire. Alarmist reactions or panic, as well as obsessive extremism are likely to derail the future of the negotiations which shall tackle the more important questions of a political dimension and other issues which both parties--and the nation as well--have already acknowledged as forming the very roots of the state of hostilities between the two parties.

The further assumption of these negotiations is that it is generally acknowledged that the Cory government is exempt from the responsibility of those issues which had provoked a significant sector of our society and people into taking up arms. This historical perspective would do well to create an atmosphere of flexibility, rather than of defensiveness on the part of government during the talks.

It need hardly be stressed that what appeared to have exacerbated the government posture vis-a-vis the rebels even after the toppling of the dictatorship, was the sense of defensiveness on the part of certain sectors of government on the issues and grievances that were being raised by the rebels--not only the NDF or the CPP-NPA--groups. Let us be very candid: part of this defensive posture derived from the perception that certain individuals within government groups felt, somehow, a responsibility in the issues and grievances.

All that, we hope, is over. The present defense minister himself appears to take the position of President Aquino that somehow, the government and the nation must have a fresh start and this is only possible if the sins and crimes of the past are regarded more objectively and the government, instead of appearing protective, should have the courage and moral commitment to rectify those wrongs.

If the government succeeds in projecting such a judicious and statesmanlike posture, it would be shameful for any rebel group to behave otherwise.

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CSO: 4200/188

NPA DENIES CORPUZ CLAIM ON MIRANDA BOMB, ASSURES 'NO ILL WILL'

Manila PHILIPPINE DAILY INQUIRER in English 10 Nov 86 pp 1, 7

[Text] A TOP military tactician of the New People's Army broke years of silence to deny a claim made by Lt. Col. Victor Corpuz linking the dissidents to the 1971 Plaza Miranda bombing.

In a separate statement, the NPA General Staff said Corpuz need not fear a communist reprisal as it warned the recently-recommissioned reserve military officer to instead be "on guard" against the very same military men he chose to re-join forces with.

Romulo Kintanar, head of the NPA's National Operations Command, said in an open letter to Corpuz that he could not believe his former colleague in the underground movement could have made a confession linking the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) and its military arm, the NPA, to the Miranda attack.

Kintanar said he is troubled by Corpuz's allegations. "The Victor Corpuz I knew was an official of the AFP who is dignified and a gentleman, and who was exposed to truth and became a model command-

er of the NPA. I still think in the same way about you," he said.

In his letter, he pointed out the various stages in the CPP's history when they stood side-by-side as enemy military men zero in on their rebel bases.

"I do not blame you if you decide to serve anew the AFP on the belief it will change and genuinely serve the cause of our countrymen," Kintanar told Corpuz. "But for you to be used in the dirty ploys of a few to discredit the dignity of the party and the people's army is underserving of a gentleman adversary."

He urged Corpuz, whom he called a dear friend, to tell the truth and correct the mistakes he committed.

Kintanar signed the letter in his nom de guerre Ka Roy.

The NPA, on the other hand, denied that bombings are part of the revolutionary army's thrust in seeking power.

"Terrorist acts similar to the Plaza Miranda bombing have never been a part in the revolutionary tactics of the NPA as

they go against the interests of the masses whom we have vowed to serve," the statement read.

The NPA asked Corpuz to rethink his statement, saying that the charges, which they called outrageous, not only are a great disservice to the revolutionary movement but may be used by "saboteurs" in the Aquino government to scuttle the peace talks and restore fascist rule by toppling the Aquino regime.

"We assure Lt. Col. Victor Corpuz that he need not fear for his life from the revolutionary forces," it said. "We harbor him no ill will."

"We would like to caution him to be on guard with the people he is now identified with lest he suffer the same fate of former comrades in the past who decided to cooperate with the enemy forces only to be executed in the end by their new-found benefactor."

Corpuz, who had not gone home for days, could not be reached for comment. Relatives at his house in Quezon City said they do not know his whereabouts.

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CSO: 4200/179

HEALTH MINISTER HITS GROWING POLARIZATION IN SOCIETY

Quezon City NATIONAL MIDWEEK in English 19 Nov 86 pp 10-11

["Excerpts" from the keynote address delivered by Alfredo R.A. Bengzon, Minister of Health, at the second national congress of the Bansang Nagkakaisa sa Diwa at Layunin (BANDILA), held at the Ateneo de Manila's Loyola Center last October 11. Health Minister Bengzon stressed that he was speaking not as a government official but as "a fellow traveler in the journey of national restructuring" and as a participant in "the university of causes [and] the parliament of the streets."]

[Text] The middle ground, which we have so clearly staked out and which all our efforts secured, nurtured and widened as a viable homestead for the Filipino nation, is now being threatened by the twin forces of extremism from Right and Left elements, and from our own weaknesses and failures. I would like to talk about the continuing struggle for the middle ground, the battle to assure a place for the many colors between the red and the khaki.

What is happening to our dearly held middle ground?

In the period immediately preceding the February Revolution, the middle ground was the area identified with the peaceful transition from dictatorship to democracy. From the time of Ninoy's assassination to the installation of his widow as president, the middle ground was a resurgent force winning people's support and participation over the insistent negativism of the Left which consistently denied the possibility of peaceful change, and over the threatening intimidation of the Right which consistently denied the possibility of any transition whatsoever from dictatorship to democracy. Despite the boycott line of the Left and the steadfast pro-Marcos stance of the Right, our middle forces persevered in the protest movement, in the electoral exercises and in the civil disobedience campaigns. Our efforts found favor in our people. And the people made possible our President governing from Malacanang. End of Chapter One.

What is happening to our dearly held middle ground in Chapter Two?

Our President stands squarely in the Center, the people stand steady around her. Together the President and her people wish to move as one in the direction of national prosperity. But the forces of the Left and the Right

want the Center to lean their way first before moving forward. The pseudo-democrats of the Left want the Center to liquidate the Right in the guise of assuring peace. The closet fascists of the Right also want the Center to eliminate the Left in the guise of assuring order. In the Center itself, there are many opportunists who have taken on various guises without truly taking on the people's causes.

Here we are in the midst of these alignments. And it is difficult to discern.

What is happening to the middle ground? Three major developments are of concern. One is the influx towards the Middle by many impostors, pretenders and fakes. The future struggle shall unmask and expose them. Another is the loss of Cory Aquino as the chief spokesperson of the middle political forces due to her elevation as the chief spokesperson of government and nation. The Middle's loss is the nation's gain. But this has got to be remedied by us. We need a personality who can embody and epitomize the impulses and thinking of the Middle. The third development is the growing polarization again between the Left and the Right, threatening to obliterate the viable Middle that we fought so hard to establish.

The question is how do we best protect the Middle which also happens to be the central political authority in government. I believe that we do this by constantly articulating the concerns of our constituents. I believe that we should aggressively pursue the reforms that we perceive as necessary without having to second-guess how our President feels about such reforms. She has articulated a direction that can be described as essentially peace for prosperity, prosperity for peace. I think this general direction provides us with a great area for political work that addresses specific concerns.

The Middle must make its demands and strike out its directions. Let us not be handicapped by the fact that some of our best comrades are in government and our cause-oriented efforts usually have an element of government criticism. This is unavoidable and it should not be a hindrance to action. Now that people's power is in place, it should pursue people's purposes. We should not make the mistake of acting like an influential lobby group with good connections; we should continue to act in a public manner, expressing our views and pushing for directions openly while keeping an arm's-length attitude towards government. We should not make the mistake of acting like a silent majority but we should act as an articulate, forthright and persistent advocate of majority causes.

I sense that the passion that accompanied persecution is leaving us. I also sense that the complacency that comes with good connections is growing. Let us reverse these by putting ourselves on a war footing again. There are many key struggles ahead. We should keep our muscles in tone by waging the battles that win our people's wishes. For example, we should wage propaganda to continually expose hidden wealth and ill-gotten treasure; we should mobilize to push government to throw the book at those who profited from the past. Justice in this regard is an issue which I believe is close to our people's hearts.

I for one, as a government official, am willing to subject myself to the discipline of cause-oriented groups demanding reforms in health. You should look at all other officials in the same way. Willingly or otherwise, all of government must be made accountable to the people. The middle forces must lead the way in making such accountability matter by securing gains for the people.

What is happening to the middle ground? Have we become less creative, or less courageous, or both? Where are the bright, fresh attacks and approaches that marked the pre-February Revolution protest movement — the thinking which created yellow confetti, Peso for Cory, Cory-vans, xerox journalism? Where have all the earnest activists of the Middle gone? Too much action has moved into the corridors of power. Too much reliance is being placed on backroom meetings and audiences with the President. Let us go back to our popular roots. Let us work with the mass movement to preserve the gains of the people. Let us keep our eyes open for opportunities to stand up for the people. Let us seize such opportunities without hesitation or timidity.

If we come away from this congress with a conviction that the middle forces need to mobilize for issues close to the middle forces' hearts, one big step shall have been taken. If we come away from this congress convinced in our need to pursue initiatives independent of government, new doors will be opened. If we come away from this congress resolute in pushing the revolution forward, new impulses will energize our efforts. BANDILA must strike out in the direction of the mass movement, it must continue to protect the middle ground, it must forge a strategy which will allow initiative instead of passivity, clear directions instead of diffused concern, active effort instead of reactive response.

Magbalik tayo sa mga tao, sapagkat nasa kanila ang ating mga ugat, ang ating lakas at ating diwa.

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CSO: 4200/179

WEEKLY ANALYZES MERITS OF ANTICOMMUNIST MOVEMENT

Quezon City NATIONAL MIDWEEK in English 19 Nov 86 p 48

["Vantage Point" by Luis V. Teodoro: "The Merits of Anti-Communism"]

[Text] To see the Marcos diehards brandishing their outsize steamers and placards (methods of communication shamelessly borrowed from the mass organizations they attack as communist), with their lurid caricatures of what they think Communists look like and their circa 1950s slogans, is to appreciate not only what money can do but also to realize that decades of anti-communist propaganda are taking root in the frustrations of our stagnant society.

Too many observers dismiss the Marcos diehard rallies as the result of their leaders' P20-to-P50-per-head tactics. Some of the participants no doubt attend these rallies because they have been paid to do so, but to say that all have been so lured is to misjudge these rallies' potential.

These rallies were initially based on the vast frustrations of much of our population over the tenacity of our problems. These problems remained and even worsened through the years of the Marcos dictatorship - but this is a fact participants in these rallies tend to ignore (the past always seems better than the present, in any case). The rallies have taken on a virulent anti-communist character, however, and the combination of frustrations and the identification of scapegoats (the Communists with whom, the diehards say, the Aquino government has a de facto alliance) for these frustrations is not without possibilities for dangerous developments.

Almost every adult, middle-class Filipino from the age of 21 onwards has been exposed at one time or another to the effort to show in communism everything anathema to what they are supposed to hold dear (God, motherhood and country, for example), although the terms may have changed since, let us say, the 1950s. While events have tended to prove that some of the anti-communists' claims have been outright fabrications (the claim that Mao Tsetung was ordered by Stalin to defend North Korea, for example) they persist, just the same, in making outlandish claims about what Communists believe in and what they're doing.

Outlandish as these claims are, the perpetrators are, however, not to be laughed at. Alan Jasminez, Secretary General of the Partido ng Bayan, has

quite correctly pointed out that neither the outlandishness of the anti-communist Marcos diehards' claims nor the bankruptcy of their cause (the return of dictatorship) guarantees that no one will attend their rallies - or even refuse to be organized by them. The Marcos diehards, Jasminez continues, can build on mass frustrations and create a large mass movement based not only on ex-Marcos officials, displaced bureaucrats and lower middle-class people who think they had a better time of it during the dictatorship, but also on the lumpen proletariat - the so-called "dregs" of society: thugs, petty criminals, the professionally idle, pimps, etc.

There is a large lumpen proletariat in Third World countries, with their conditions of chronic unemployment, their service economies, and their traditions of government and social corruption. This "class" is as much a victim of the neo-colonial order as the workers, peasants, professionals and indigenous businessmen are. But its social experience has created for it values that tend to celebrate anti-social behavior. Its frustrations thus find expression not in involvement in reformist or revolutionary movements but in mindless violence, the commission of which gives it a false sense of redressing wrongs.

The beating to death of an Aquino supporter during one of the Marcosist rallies, for example, was probably the work of elements from this class, who found some sense of misplaced justice in inflicting violence on a system of which they were victims through a person who was, unlike that system, palpable and within reach.

The point is that the vast inequities and economic hardships our society forces upon the majority of the populace not only create fertile ground for revolution - which, such as it is, is an eminently social undertaking, since it seeks the transformation of society - but also for thuggery and destructive violence, phenomena that are deeply anti-social.

The violence endemic in our society and which attends our daily lives, but which is severed from any socially-redeeming purpose, is a function of social and national underdevelopment. It is that fund of violence the Marcos diehards can build on (as they are already building on it, calling, for example, for violence against leaders of the anti-dictatorship organizations), exploiting which they can create a movement premised on the return of Marcos-type rule and the homogenization of thought, based on their notions of what ideas are acceptable and what are not (which is an extremely narrow range, indeed).

These possibilities are one more argument for the urgent need to properly address the problems of Philippine society - for the Aquino government, specifically, to realize that its own survival and that of the democratic space it says it wants to enlarge depends on its ability to mitigate mass poverty and, therefore, its consequences.

The anti-communist campaign currently being waged by the Marcosists and the defense minister is thus not without merits. It compels us, among others, to be aware of the sinister possibilities that lurk in the dark, unswept corners of our society, where the filth and garbage of decades have steadily accumulated.

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DESICCATED COCONUT ISSUE SPLITS PCA

Manila MANILA BULLETIN in English 10 Nov 86 p 25

[Text] Discussion on guidelines intended to rationalize the desiccated coconut industry has split the executives of the Philippine Coconut Authority (PCA) into two groups.

PCA chairman Oscar Santos said this seeming polarization on the vital issue surfaced in last Friday's management staff meeting when one group battled for a "free market zone" in the little-known desiccated coconut industry.

This group, Santos said, believes that all investors who are willing to set up coconut desiccating plants should be allowed to do so. Their belief is premised on the statement that "we are in a free and democratic

society so that the interplay of market forces should be allowed."

Since the monopolistic machinery set up by the previous administration on commodities like sugar and coconut had already been dismantled, there is no valid reason why the government should not allow the willing investors to pump in their resources in the desiccated coconut industry, the numbers of the group were quoted as saying.

"Free competition has always been an important ingredient in a free and democratic society like ours," they said.

However, the members of the opposing group said that freedom in a democracy is not absolute. They said the government should institute some

controls in any industry in order to protect the interest of the greater number of people that would ultimately rebound to the benefit of the entire country.

For instance, if there is excess capacity in the coconut industry, the government can prevent other investors from setting up their desiccating plants, the group pointed out.

At present, the desiccated coconut world production is placed at 200,000 metric tons a year and only 120,000 metric tons are being consumed.

The Philippines supplies about 80 percent of the world requirement which has remained constant in the past years.

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TWO CORDILLERA DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS ANNOUNCED

Manila MANILA BULLETIN in English 8 Nov 86 pp 1, 15

[Text]

The Ministry of Food and Agriculture (MFA) announced yesterday that it is undertaking two projects in the Cordilleras — the Highland Agriculture Development Project (HADP) and the Central Cordillera Development Project (CCDP).

Agriculture Minister Ramon Mitra Jr. said that the HADP is designed to intensify the production of established crops as well as contribute to agricultural diversification in Benguet and western Mountain Province.

The CCDP, he added, is intended to ensure the development of the Cordillera region by financing projects that can generate immediate benefits to the small farmers and communities in Ifugao, Mt. Province, Abra, Nueva Vizcaya, and Kalinga-Apayao.

Mitra said that the Asian Development Bank (ADB) and the International Food and Agricultural Development (IFAD) are extend-

ing a loan of \$18.8 million and \$4.6 million, respectively, to finance the \$26.9 million project, with \$3.5 million as the local counterpart.

He explained that the loan from the IFAD will be spent for the HADP's research and extension components.

The financing for the CCDP, amounting to \$19.3 million, will be undertaken by the European Economic Community (EEC) through a grant of \$18.1 million, with \$1.2 million as the local counterpart, Mitra added.

The project components for the HADP include the construction and rehabilitation of communal irrigation systems, rural and national roads; agricultural research, extension, and marketing; and project management.

The CCDP also comprises the rehabilitation and improvement of roads, existing irrigation facilities and of new irrigation systems; production of staple food, cultivation for high-value crops, improvement of research and extension services, poultry and live-

stock production and breeding, aquaculture, and fruit trees production; agricultural credit; domestic water supply; construction of Bailey bridges and foot bridges; construction of manually-operated tram lines; training; and marketing.

Both projects have a five-year duration, from 1987 to 1991.

The HADP is expected to benefit 6,800 farm households, while the beneficiaries of the CCDP are still being estimated. The loan agreement with ADB will be signed this month, while co-financing from the IFAD is still for discussion.

For the CCDP, the signing of the grant agreement with the EEC is tentatively set for December this year.

The government agencies involved with these two projects, aside from the MAF, are the Ministry of Public Works and Highways (MPWH) and the National Irrigation Administration (NIA).

The Cordillera encompasses the Cagayan Valley provinces of Kalinga-Apayao, Mountain Province, Ifugao, and Cagayan, and the Davao provinces of Benguet and Abra.

It has about 480,000 inhabitants. It is a rich land hard up on cash, where illiteracy is high and employment low.

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CSO: 4200/179

CORDILLERA ALLIANCE SPOKESMEN DEFINE AUTONOMY

Quezon City NATIONAL MIDWEEK in English 19 Nov 86 pp 18-21, 47

[Interview by the Cordillera News and Features Working Group with spokespersons of the Cordillera People's Alliance (CPA), which spearheaded the autonomy campaign in the Cordillera; date and place not given]

[Text] What is regional autonomy?

Regional autonomy means that the Cordillera people will be self-governing and united in one region. The Cordillera Regional Autonomous Government will be a special unit of local government that will see to it that the provisions on the rights of indigenous people of the Cordillera are implemented as mandated in the national constitution. It will also serve as the representative body for the Cordillera people on all matters concerning the Cordillera.

What are the main features of Cordillera regional autonomy?

Regional autonomy as envisioned for the Cordillera has five main features:

One: The Igorot people are given control over their ancestral domain - the Cordillera: the land, resources and territory.

Two: The Cordillera Regional Autonomous Government will have its own legislature, administration and judiciary.

Three: The traditional institutions of the people are accorded the respect and recognition they deserve within the structures and processes of the autonomous government.

Four: The indigenous culture of the Igorots is protected and developed according to the people's wishes, and steps are taken to correct past discriminatory practices against the Igorot people.

Five: The Cordillera people are properly represented in national organs of the government and are entitled to equal rights as the rest of the Filipino people, aside from their particular rights as indigenous people.

Is regional autonomy different from regionalization?

Yes, regionalization and regional autonomy both recog-

nize the need to unite the Cordillera people in one region on the basis of shared geography, culture, problems and aspirations.

Regionalization, however, simply means treating the Cordillera as one administrative region and streamlining the bureaucracy to facilitate administration by the national government.

Regional autonomy goes beyond regionalization because it provides for self-government by the people in the legislative, administrative and judicial aspects of government. It recognizes indigenous political systems still in practice as viable forms of self-government on the local level. It allows the people to make policies for their own economic, social and cultural development.

Is regional autonomy the same as secession?

No. Secession means the choice of a people to break away from one state to form another independent state. Regional autonomy is different from secession, and we believe that the Cordillera Regional Autonomous Government (CRAG) should remain an integral part of the Philippine Republic.

Regional autonomy is not independence but rather political integrity. It will be practiced with due respect for the territorial integrity of the Philippines and will not impair the legitimate interests and political unity of the entire Filipino people. The Igorots are Filipinos and there is no reason for them to secede from the Filipino nation.

Is Cordillera regional autonomy different from the regional autonomy granted to the Moro people under the Tripoli Agreement?

Yes. First of all, it must be pointed out that the Tripoli

Agreement was never implemented by the Marcos administration. A government subservient to foreign and local vested interests cannot implement genuine regional autonomy.

The Tripoli Agreement signed on December 23, 1976 by the MNLF and the Philippine government representatives provides in general terms for a Moro autonomous region with its own territory and its own administrative, legislative, judicial, educational, and security systems. The agreement also stipulates that amnesty shall be granted to the MNLF and all political prisoners.

Certain limitations can be pointed out in the Tripoli Agreement. For one, the agreement lacks detailed specifications on the guiding principles on autonomy. It concedes to the national government the continued right to exploit the natural resources within the region. Another weakness is that the agreement allowed the appointment of executive officials rather than having them elected.

The Tripoli Agreement is not a complete assertion of the Moro people's right to self-determination. It offers some insights and possible approaches for the consideration of the Cordillera Regional Autonomous Government, but it cannot be regarded as a model. We should work out our own principles and structures according to the existing conditions and aspirations of our people.

Is an autonomous region the same as a federal state?

No. Regional autonomy means that the Cordillera people will be one region with its own structures for self-government and a part of the Philippine estate. A federal form of government means that a country is composed of several states.

Federalism is one made out of many, that is to say, several territorial communities come together, not to merge as one unified whole, but with the admission that conflicting interests exist among component states. In the experience of other nations, federations have failed because of certain conditions. Unbalanced federal arrangements rarely succeed, as when great disparity exists in the level of development of the federal units. Multi-unit federal arrangements also have a better chance of success than those with only few units.

All of these considerations should be studied in choosing a federal or unitary government for the country. The rights of indigenous people to self-determination can be answered by regional autonomy either within a unitary Philippine state or within a federal state. However, federalism is a national question which concerns all Filipinos and cannot be decided in the Cordillera alone.

What is the relationship of the CRAG with the national government?

The relationship between the autonomous regional government and the national government will be defined in terms of the authority granted to the autonomous region and the power exercised by the national government. Policies relating to the entire Philippines must be the responsibility of the national government. Policies specific to the Cordillera shall be worked out by the Cordillera Regional Autonomous Government.

What is the basis for the Igorot people's demand for regional autonomy?

The Igorots are the indigenous people of the Cordillera. While the majority of the Filipinos

were integrated into the colonial system during the Spanish period, the Igorots resisted subjugation and persisted in their indigenous lifeways. As a result, their indigenous social systems, culture and laws continue to function until today in varying degrees of effectivity vis-a-vis the dominant structures of the national government. This has given them a distinct identity as Kaigorotan, with particular problems, rights and aspirations.

The Igorot people are now demanding regional autonomy as the concrete embodiment of these rights.

Is regional autonomy a new idea?

No. Regional autonomy is accepted and practiced internationally as a form of self-government on the local level. Regional autonomy has been granted to indigenous peoples in such countries as China, Nicaragua, Honduras and Pakistan.

Do all ethnic groups have the right to regional autonomy?

No. In the Philippines, other ethno-linguistic groups like the Ilocanos, Tagalogs, Visayans, Bicolanos and others, have not maintained their indigenous socio-political institutions which existed before colonization by the Spaniards. They have largely been assimilated into the Philippine state and have participated in its administration. Little or no contradiction exists between state institutions and their socio-political institutions on the local level. Neither is there a strong demand among these groups for regional autonomy within the Philippine state.

Is providing regional autonomy in the Constitution not "class legislation"?

No. Class legislation exists when the law creates inequality

among the people by giving undue advantage to certain groups in society. The constitutional provision for regional autonomy is not class legislation because, in the first place, there is already the inequality in development between the indigenous peoples and the rest of the Filipinos which should be corrected. From historical experience, there is a clear need to protect the indigenous people from discrimination and neglect.

The indigenous peoples are therefore entitled to protection by the constitutional provision of *parens patriae*. By this provision, persons suffering from serious disadvantage or handicap, which places them in a position of actual inequality in their relations or transactions with others, are entitled to protection by the state.

What will be the structure of the Cordillera Regional Autonomous Government?

At the highest level, a Cordillera regional government will be established with its own regional legislative assembly, its own regional executive branch and its own judicial system. The regional government will also be charged with the responsibility of representing and guaranteeing the exercise of autonomy with the support of the national government. All major ethnic groups and sectors in the Cordillera will be properly represented on the regional level.

The structure below this regional government will have to conform to existing sociopolitical structures of the people. This will enable the traditional community leaders and systems of collective decision-making to be represented in the national government. Other current forms of organization and territorial divisions will also be respected where these are practiced.

The final and definite structures of the CRAG will still have to be worked out in consultations and through a democratic process. To this end, the Cordillera People's Alliance (CPA) has set up a charter committee to conduct research and consult with the people.

Where will the regional center of the Cordillera Autonomous Government be located?

The problem of the regional center for the Cordillera is a problem under the present setup and it will also be a problem for the Cordillera autonomous region. It will continue to be a problem so long as the roads in the region are not improved. The first step, therefore, should be to build better roads to facilitate transportation to and within the region.

The location of the regional center will be decided by the people. There can be more than one center, taking into account the location of already existing offices. The decision can only be reached by weighing the advantages and disadvantages of each suggestion toward serving the needs of the whole and the interests of the majority of the Cordillera people.

How will the autonomous government deal with investments connected with the exploitation of the natural resources of the Cordillera?

All investments concerned with the disposition, exploration, development, exploitation or utilization of minerals, coal, petroleum and other sources of potential energy and forest resources will be undertaken only by national or local corporations.

Only citizens of the Philippines and domestic corporations owned by Filipino citizens will be allowed to own, hold or

acquire an interest in any corporation engaged in the disposition, exploration, development, exploitation and utilization of the natural resources of the Cordillera.

The autonomous government will have the sole authority to approve licenses for the operation of such corporations within the Cordillera ancestral domain.

How will the Cordillera Regional Autonomous Government solve the land problem in the Cordillera?

The Cordillera Regional Autonomous Government will work for the recognition and guarantee of the inalienable collective land rights of the Cordillera people over their ancestral domain. This means that all government policies which declared the Cordillera as public domain in violation of the people's rights to their ancestral land will be repealed.

Rights to ancestral land will be recognized on the basis of traditionally held rights of each Cordillera community. We condemn those who occupy or claim the ancestral lands of other Igorots or those who claim land over which their community has no traditional claim.

Land reform will be fully implemented to rid the Cordillera of absentee and parasitic big landlords. Steps will also be taken to recover lands unscrupulously grabbed by opportunists. All concessions will be reviewed to ascertain that these will benefit the people. If not, these will be revoked and the lands recognized as communal property. Private titles will be recognized where these have already become accepted practice among the people.

Other policies dealing with the land problem will have to be

reviewed by and threshed out with the people concerned, considering the complexity of the land problem in the Cordillera.

Legitimate rights of all residents, including non-Igorots, will be respected.

Will the Cordillera have its own army?

No. As part of the Philippines, our external defense should be guaranteed by the national army. Within the Cordillera, there is widespread fear and condemnation of the abuses committed against the Igorot people by military units. With the establishment of the Cordillera Regional Autonomous Government, we will develop a security police force drawn from local people and under the control of the civilian authority. Operations of national military forces within the region will only be allowed with the agreement of the Cordillera autonomous government.

How will the autonomous government secure its financial resources?

One source of revenue for the autonomous government would be the share of the Cordillera in the budget of the national government. The Cordillera is entitled to a share of the national income, in return for the contributions it has made from the exploitation of its resources.

A second source is local taxation. At present, the bulk of taxes paid by the mines, logging concessions and other industries in the area goes to the national government. Only a fraction is paid to the local government. Under a regional autonomous government, the Cordillera will be guaranteed direct benefit from the exploitation of its resources as a greater part of these taxes will be paid to the autonomous region.

A third source is foreign aid. Some countries and international agencies have indicated their willingness to provide financial assistance particularly for the development of indigenous people.

Does autonomy mean that all Igorots will be forced to follow certain traditions?

No. Autonomy is a means of removing the oppressions the Igorot people have suffered for generations. It would be wrong to gain autonomy only to replace one form of oppression with another. The culture, laws and practices of each and all ethnic groups in the Cordillera will be respected.

Will non-Igorots be prejudiced or be deprived of benefits with the establishment of regional autonomy in the Cordillera?

No. If you are an ordinary non-Igorot resident of the Cordillera, you stand to benefit along with the rest, and all your democratic rights will be guaranteed. Autonomy will be the basis for greater economic prosperity in the region which will benefit all. At present, we all suffer from living in a neglected region where health-care facilities, education, other social services and the provision of basic necessities are inadequate. An autonomous government would have more commitment to serving the needs of all people in the Cordillera than the present system of government.

In areas where non-Igorots are the majority, they will enjoy all existing rights and will also be represented in the new regional legislature. In areas where non-Igorots are a minority, they will also be given proportional representation in local decision-making.

Who would be the main beneficiaries of regional autonomy?

The main beneficiaries of regional autonomy will be the farmers, workers, professionals, local businessmen, traditional leaders, local officials and other groups whose economic, social, cultural and political rights will be guaranteed by the autonomous government. The whole Cordillera people will also benefit with the recognition of their collective rights to self-determination.

How popular is the move for regional autonomy?

Regional autonomy enjoys popular support from a broad spectrum of forces. Various groups have expressed their agreement with the principle of autonomy for the Cordillera in varying degrees and shades.

The Cordillera People's Alliance composed of more than 120 organizations is working for genuine regional autonomy with particular legislative, administrative and judicial systems to safeguard the indigenous people's rights. CPA views regional autonomy as part of the nationalist and democratic aspirations of the whole country.

Minister Juan Ponce Enrile has expressed his agreement with autonomy as a means of solving the insurgency problem in the Cordillera. However, he sets certain limits on his definition of autonomy, such as excluding the right of the people over their mineral and forest resources, and also excluding parts of Kalinga-Apayao and Ifugao from the autonomous region. These conditions entirely negate the Cordillera people's right to self-determination and merely expose his vested interests.

The Partido Nacionalista ng Pilipinas under Blas Ople has also submitted a resolution in the Constitutional Commission endorsing autonomy in general terms.

Jose Maria Sison, founder of the Communist Party of the Philippines, proposed autonomy within a unitary and revolutionary coalition government in the country.

What problems do we expect to encounter in setting-up an autonomous government?

We expect to meet strong opposition from those who stand to lose with the establishment of a genuine regional autonomous government. Foreign investors will try to retain control over the exploitation of the Cordillera's natural resources. Big landlords and businessmen who have enriched themselves at the expense of the Cordillera people will want to maintain the present system. Influential officials and politicians will fight to block the wishes and aspirations of the majority of the people, but through the cooperative efforts of all groups, sectors and communities — government, church, workers, urban poor, profes-

sionals, businessmen and others—we are confident that the people's will shall prevail.

How can we achieve genuine regional autonomy?

Genuine regional autonomy can be achieved only through the Igorot people's unrelenting collective assertions of their right to self-determination. It can be realized through the concerned efforts of all Cordillera people together with the rest of the Filipino people to achieve a sovereign and democratic Filipino nation which upholds indigenous people's rights. All forms and arenas of mass struggle must be used to counter national oppression and to build the people's capacity for autonomy at all levels.

The actual building of autonomous structures in the Cordillera will require a process of education, organization and participation of the people themselves in all aspects of self-government. This process has started and will continue even while efforts are being made to get the national government to recognize these rights of the Cordillera people.

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CSO: 4200/179

BRIEFS

CERTAIN NPA'S OPPOSE CEASE-FIRE--[By Owen Masaganda] Lopez, Quezon--Three units of the New People's Army (NPA) operating along the boundary of Quezon and the Bicol region have reportedly expressed their disagreement with the ceasefire accord signed Thursday by representatives of the Aquino government and the National Democratic Front (NDF). Sources told the MANILA BULLETIN that these NPA groups "prefer to be independent" and are "not under the control of the NDF." The NDF, through emissaries Satur Ocampo and Antonion Zumel, had assured the government, however, that it has control over all units of the NPA in the country, and can effectively enforce the ceasefire agreement. It was gathered that some armed rebels in Quezon are not "actual communists" and went to the hills only because they were victims of government neglect and abuses during the regime of deposed President Ferdinand Marcos. There are also armed groups roaming the mountains of Quezon pretending to be NPA guerrillas but are actually bandits, the sources added. [Excerpt] [Manila MANILA BULLETIN in English 30 Nov 86 pp 1, 12 HK] /6662

SIN CALLS FOR 'NATIONAL RENEWAL'--Manila Archbishop Jaime Cardinal Sin will call on the people today in celebration of the first Sunday of Advent to redouble their effort at national renewal as the problem of corruption remains. In a pastoral letter to be read in all Catholic churches, Sin said the "miracle of February" has not done away with the "erosion of moral values and the murky moral climate" of the pre-revolution era. "Despite the great gains and undeniable progress, there remain longstanding problems of persistent corruption, of evils grown inveterate, and the enduring divisions of society," he said. Sin said that while the country's situation remains unstable, "hope remains strong" and that the people can now share "a new moment in our nation's history; a crucial time of reconstruction." Advent is the beginning of the church year and marks the four Sundays before Christmas. [Text] [Manila THE MANILA CHRONICLE in English 30 Nov 86 pp 1, 3 HK] /6662

CSO: 4200/188

COLUMNIST: MILITARY SHOULD CUT ITS DEVELOPMENT ROLE

Bangkok BAN MUANG in Thai 17 Sep 86 p 5

[Article by Columnist: "Ta Moh Loh"]

[Text] The policy statement that the government made to parliament contained some phrases which I thought were interesting, but I have not heard anybody talk about them.

It concerned the policy on defense. Item 6 says: "...will increase the role of the military in the development of the country in order to help the people and support national public disaster relief work."

The military increased its work by stepping in to take up the role of developing the country in order to help the people, which is a civilian role, because of domestic terrorism carried on by the Communist Party of Thailand.

It is a war to win the hearts and minds of the people; a lot of lives have been lost and a lot of blood shed on both sides. Throughout this time, the military has been working very hard.

"Conditions" for the war are underdevelopment in the rural areas, abject poverty, abuse of authority by government officials, etc.

And you readers know about these as well as I do.

These conditions have been created by civilian government officials.

The military found it necessary to step in to take up the role of developing the country in order to help the people and to eliminate the conditions for war. And the military has been extremely successful in its work.

The many areas nationwide known as areas in which to win the hearts and minds of the people, designated as "red areas" and "pink areas"--these are the areas where the military has gone to work and turn them into "white areas."

The results of the work done by the military remains for us to see until today, and this has become the military's job.

The government has seen the results, and so it has a policy to increase the role of the military in the development of the country in order to help the people.

I see it as an unfair policy for the military.

That the military took up the role of developing the rural areas of the country was part of a strategy to win the war. And now the war has ended, or at least the situation has been brought under control. And so the work in the development should come to an end.

It should transfer the work to the civilians so that the latter can carry on with it in accordance with the functions of the civilians.

It is the same thing with public disaster relief work, sir. The military moves out to do the work until the situation is safe, and then the military lets go its hands and moves back into its normal position.

In the same manner, when the war to win the hearts and minds of the people or the terrorism by the Communist Party of Thailand is over, and we have returned to help each other develop the country, the military should decrease its role in the area of development and let the civilians take up more and more of that role, or the civilians will become paralyzed, not knowing the work or being incapable of doing it.

This is contradictory to the principles of administration, be they democratic or not. The military's and the civilians' responsibilities must be separate and proportional, or else there will be a problem of imbalance in the administration of the country.

For this reason, I am of the opinion that the government's policy of increasing the role of the military in the development of the country is not correct.

The first problem that we can see is the problem of government agencies doing the tasks that overlap each other, which is a big problem that cannot be solved until today.

It causes a waste of budget because of an overlap of work or because of a lack of coordination--the waste just cannot be assessed.

It causes the military budget to be higher than what reality dictates. This is because the budget for the development of the country is piled on top of the military budget.

It causes confusion in budgeting and the military is attacked for its budget.

It causes problems in the military line of work, because military personnel do not like to work in the civilian line of work.

This article is not a denial of the military role in the development of the country in order to help people, but I feel that there should be no increase in the role of the military because it increases its burden unnecessarily.

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DEPUTY FINANCE MINISTER ON ECONOMIC STRATEGY

Bangkok SU ANAKHOT in Thai 24-30 Sep pp 23-26

[Speech by Dr Suphachai Phanitchaphak, deputy finance minister, at the Ambassador Hotel on 19 September 1986]

[Text] Of late, there have been some informed people taking part in the political process in order to formulate the economic policy. The opposition, whose members argue against the government on this point every week, also puts forth some weird economic policies every week and then tells the newspapers about them, as if it were producing projects as constituent parts of the policy to meet a short deadline. As for the political parties in the coalition government, each has rather excellent advisors and economic plans, each preparing to cut down on this or that or increase this or that. In some areas the planned reductions are so different, and in some areas, the increase goes as high as 1 to 10 or 20 billion baht, or whatever. And all these have made enormous problems for me, for the fact is that although I am from a political party, I try to be impartial and put myself in the shoes of the ministry, which many people say is "selling opium" (misleading the public so much that they get high) once again. I am not blaming them for anything. Why? Because I do not want a ministry that "sells opium." That is, I am going to do something that has substance, which means we must coordinate the interests of every party, whichever party that may be in the coalition. If we were to make it the best, I think that what the current government should do is to produce a national policy, especially, a national economic policy. A national policy will differ from a general policy that comes from each political party or each group in that a national policy must be acceptable to all sides.

Second, what I think will be very important in the future is that we are going to lay down a policy that to some extent does not lack continuity, meaning that once this government is gone, the people who will continue to "weave" this policy can take comfort in the fact that what they see is the right direction. It would be just like this government to accept things that have been done by the preceding government. The good part, the part that should continue to be "woven," should not be erased simply because it was done by someone else and simply by saying: "I am a newcomer, I have new knowledge, and I am going to do new things."

Third, it is necessary for me to speak to you frankly and openly on what problems are facing our nation and country, and to say that coming to power this time, the government is not at all lucky as some people have said, because, they say, the interest rates are down, oil prices are down, trade deficits are down, and everything is down. I do not regard these things as being lucky. They might even be a burden. During the period in which everything is unfolding in a positive manner, how are we going to bring the benefits resulting from the positive unfolding of things and redistribute them so that they will stimulate and revive the economy and solve the structural problems? You might recall that every time there were cyclical problems lasting only a short period of time, we would determine that the immediate problems must be solved first. We would be able to "open our eyes and our mouth" to breathe a little better; we would be able to respond that all the burdensome problems surrounding us are getting better. At that point we would run out of excuses that we had to wait for time to elapse in order to solve problems that required reform or structural measures. Regarding this, I consider it to be of great importance that it is the duty of this government. I do not consider it an easy task in reforming important sectors of the economy, or else in the future, we would not be able to claim to the people or foreigners that at this time we are not getting the full benefits from the existing opportunity that we have.

And so the matter of a loss of opportunities is an important matter. At a more detailed level, a loss of economic opportunities for Thailand is often not considered important. But I consider it important in forming an economic policy, in looking for ways to help the Thai economy, which is languishing, sitting, and sleeping, so that it can get up, stand up, and walk or run into the future. That job is not as easy as we think. And so we must coordinate interests and look for a common front and minimize a situation where there is pressures from the opposition every week. Then in the future, there will be two parliamentary sessions and, therefore, there will be analyses and criticisms of the government at all time. This is a matter for which the government side must prepare itself and be always ready.

I do not expect to get much done here today. I ask for permission not to answer two types of questions: (1) The question involving my party, questions as to what exactly is happening in my party and how it will affect the national security. I ask not to answer these questions. (2) The question of how much taxes will be reduced, especially with regard to how we are going to proceed. The problem we establish for the discussion today is the problem of how to expand employment based on limited resources. We also have established a problem for ourselves, which is simply this, that we definitely must expand employment. Our resources are also limited. There are two or three conclusions.

1. On the limited budget, we must find a way to add to some parts of the budget. We have to do that, although we may have a limited budget. We must find a way to add to the parts of budget that have to be added, without having to create more debts for the country in the future, meaning that if we have to create debts, they would be within the limit that the future government can shoulder.

2. Knowing that there are limited resources, we must be a bit broadminded, that if other people should take part in this ritual, that is, if there were members of the private sector with several very, very good ideas, and there were several requirements that the government could be relieved of, then we should be broadminded and allow the private sector to participate in the investment. In addition, there are foreign economic camps that have expressed the desire to take part in the investment. And on our part, we are hesitating because we do not know when they want to come in. We must admit that as far as the foreign investors are concerned, when they come in to Thailand to invest, they would find it necessary to take something back. But Thailand should also receive something in return on an equal basis.

3. In solving problems to revive the economy while there are limited resources, sometimes everybody does not have to pour an enormous amount of their financial resources into the investment. If there are improvements by means of transferring resources in some areas, of transferring resources from areas where they have limited use to where they have increased use, or if there are improvements and changes in some units of the system, in some rules and regulations that serve to constrain the private sector and the government sector from proceeding into the future together, then we don't need to have cash flow in the neighborhood of tens or hundreds of billions of baht to stimulate the economy to proceed in the direction that we want it to go in the future. Therefore, all the principles that have been mentioned which are said to lead to a dimension that the government has been trying to explain, especially, during the past 3 to 4 weeks--I think 3 to 4 weeks are too short a period of time for us to be able to say in which direction the government has started to proceed. But for the principles that have been mentioned--as to what to do next in the future--I think every party concerned will understand better.

First of all, we have discussed our principles for all to hear. I would like to stress for all to see that for the thing that has been done, some still regard it as too small or too ridiculous, or that it was too much for psychological reasons. That is, the matter of how budgeting is done--this is the thing that many sides would get involved in an argument about. Sometimes, they would say that in budgeting, one should consider what the revenues are first and then base the spending on those revenues. Another side would say that one should consider the economic situation and then prepare the budget based on such an economic situation in order to stimulate the economy or the changes that would help create economic cycles. An example is that the funds for the revival of the economy may be slowed, which would slow the cycles of the budget, which would in turn help stimulate the economy more. I think that regarding these things, with the limitations that our country has, we could do very little. For a simple example, in preparing a budget, there is rather little room for the movement of a free and independent policy. This is not an excuse, this is not a defense. In much of the important budgets, you will see that two of the most important parts, which are the parts of the budget that are used to repay debts, are the interest and principal. Indeed, this is the part that consists of at least 25 percent of the budget. Another part of the budget that is important

is the spending budget for the monthly salaries of government employees, which is very high. If these two parts added together, you will have only a little over 10 percent of the total budget left for investment. To make any increase or decrease, there has to be a cut on those two parts. It's not easy. We cannot just say that there were abolishments in the past or that we must reduce the number of permanent government officials. This would be a problem that, as soon as you begin, becomes a problem that cannot be easily solved.

At this point, of the principles that will emerge and that I would like to summarize here, we know very well that the problem here is that we want to revive the economy and to clear up a large number of debts. We want the budget to be the tool of the government as well. It should not be the case that the budget is just what the permanent government employees have drafted for the government to implement. We want the people to see that the government is capable of giving guidelines to the private sector as to which direction it ought to proceed. And then the government will stimulate the economy in accordance with the policy that it has stated, in which some part of the money will be used, and where that part of the money will come from. And it is necessary for us to increase the budget, or what is called the budget for the revival and development of our country's economy, which is a budget that was never included in the budgeting of Thailand, and then emphasize that this budget can be prepared based on a few principles.

Therefore, it is clear that this is a budget that is related to the creation of workforce, and it is a clear budget that will enable the private sector to see clearly that from it there can be an economic extension. A budget has to have multiple effects. This budget must be built so that it has multiple effects; from one it must increase to three, then to four, and there must be a conviction by private individuals to build on the extension of this budget in the future. It is a budget, whereby there is a recognition that in the administration of the finance ministry's work, the government has programs in which there can be joint participation, such as a program on the market that would cater to the products of the Ministry of Agriculture together with the products of the Ministry of Commerce. A budget for this then should be a budget taken from this overall budget. When we decide to use this budget for a specific thing, we then consider jointly if the use of a budget outside of the overall budget will create the benefits for a certain group or not. A simple example is the oil funds, which are being attacked here and there by the opposition parties that do not have a real understanding of economic problems; they say we have used the money for the wrong purpose, because, they say, the use of money for oil funds is for one thing and one thing only, oil. In fact, this is the kind of understanding that is wrong--it is an understanding that as far as the oil funds are concerned, if any part of the funds is used or if any part of the funds is returned for the compensation of the overall budget so that it becomes part of the larger cash flow, then it would become one and the same as the overall funds. In creating the oil funds, those involved would look to find out what the benefits of the country were or what the problems of the country were at each point in time, which would require a solution. But when the problems were gone, the government then decided that it would return the

money to the people, and that it should be returned to only certain groups that have had the opportunity to use the vehicles that used the same type of fuels. But I think those who have a part in the development of the economy or the adjustment of the structure for guidelines and suggestions are not limited to those who are involved in the matter of oil. Waiting for the oil situation to adjust itself will have a ripple effect throughout the economy. I must insist that the creation of a fund outside of the budget and the use of the money in the budget should not cause any damage. This is because in the past, the money used to support the budget has been used for the fund outside of the budget and there was some red ink. All these uses of money have had the effect of taking the money from the budget. I feel that, more and more, the uses of these funds should be for the right purposes.

First, the procedures in the budgeting are too big.

Second, regarding big projects, there should be guidelines that can be issued in 1 to 2 weeks; these were clear guidelines in the past. And if you have been following all the national projects, you would be quite fed up because the national projects were merely symbolic of the budget that could not be implemented or something like that. Regarding the economics of planning the Thai economy, the national programs would be written up to describe the forms in which the economic and political situations would take. I told them that in the future I would like to see the policies clarified by the government. It is a matter of clarity for the private sector so that they can see where they can take part. I understand that the cabinet has already sent a signal on the day on which we announced the matter of the slaughterhouse, although the slaughterhouse may seem a small matter. But it is a good example for several cases of government intervention and the increase in the role of the private sector. The policy indicates that the government is willing to make decisions on some matters that have been worrisome for many past government. And I think this is a pretty good signal. This kind of thing will continue to appear because another signal, as is indicated by the record, is another big project. That's why I say this. It might be rather personal for me; I mean, it is not a general government decision. There was no announcement of it within the government.

I believe that to stimulate the economy so that it expands there must be some big projects, one or two projects that would serve to stimulate. One project that I think should be mentioned and discussed--and I think they have made it relatively clear--which would consist of many things combined together and carried out together is the development of the eastern seaboard project, which has been delayed for so long. An in particular the project that involves a commercial seaport, which is a port that is being mentioned nowadays, is the Laem Chagang port. This port is independent. The investment in this port would have an effect that would extend itself into the investment in the industrial settlement, where there will be some 1 billion baht in new investments. The investment for all these would not necessarily come directly from the government's pocket. It is the kind of investment that could draw investors from abroad, an investment that Thai investors could rely on in a party's policy. It is what we are doing. And you will

see from the data of the construction of a factory. A factory has an export zone for exports, or if there is the construction of warehouses for the purpose of reducing the burden of export tariffs--for all these the main pillar would almost entirely be the development of the commercial seaport and the industrial settlement at Laem Chabang. This is already clear in the development plan. It is one of the projects that indicates that Thailand, which has no deep-water port, will export goods worth hundreds of billions of baht. It is necessary that we do this. And I think the sooner the government can announce this--the sooner the government can announce the steps for the implementation of this project--the sooner we will get down to it, because we consider this a matter that we must help each other oversee and "weave" it, and "weave" it into the form that we can.

The third point is related in the sense that it is related to exports, in addition to the fact that it is related to the development of the eastern seaboard at the Laem Chabang deep-water seaport. Regarding exports, we have discussed this a great deal and it is expected to be discussed a great deal in the future. One thing that we would welcome in this matter is beginning to take shape in the form of a decision within the cabinet. That is, we would like to see an export promotion board at various places, at government agencies that are involved in the promotion of exports, and at a working board at the prime minister's office. The promotion of exports will involve many groups. But no one ever thought of grouping all these boards together. There would be a constant problem of improvement in this matter. At the same time, the matter of tariffs, which would include all matters relating to exports, not just the tariffs on exports but also trade tariffs, would involve a great many things--tariffs that would have to be repaid, or tariffs and the matter of bringing in imports and then creating credits for exports, which would have to be repaid. And you would agree that they should have a center somewhere, or they should bring these units together and create a center somewhere that can be the government's hands and legs, which would work directly on this matter and give out instructions. Boards whose work overlaps each other are likely to exist. There are two things that will be done at this point: there may be a structural change into a government bureaucracy. It may relate to the Foreign Trade Department of the Ministry of Commerce, which could be developed and improved into a department on the promotion of exports, or there might be the creation of an agency or a board at the prime minister's office to deal with the work of the various boards. This agency or board would then report directly to the cabinet, maybe twice a week or once a month. Then we would learn of the problems involving exports all at the same time. I think one thing that is important for export that I hope we will see in the future is the improvement of the system of financial institutions. We see that in future exports will be very competitive, because there will be exports in the same old way, but the exported goods will be new and unusual; they will go into the markets where it will be difficult for us to compete. We will need to extend a lot more credits. There will be competition in granting credits. We have to have financial institutions to support us. This is a matter that we welcome because many in the cabinet, although there is no definite decision, are pushing it. They indicated that there is a necessity for financial institutions to support exporters specifically.

In important cases, where new exporters cannot obtain credits easily, and the commercial banks are uneasy about giving credits to new exporters or the same old exporters going into a new market, and the banks are not sure if the accounts they have opened are at a reliable bank, or the exporters cannot sell at the prices they guarantee to the banks, or in cases where there is long-term international trade credit--in all these cases we must compete with these other countries. I believe that in the future, this year or next, we must seek services from financial institutions, such as credit insurance institutions for exports that cannot be sold. This is because we have considerable leeway now in drafting legislation. But if there is this agreement of thinking, in the not too distant future we will be able to create such an institution. And I believe that in the short term it can happen, which would be good for the promotion of exports of services, which Thailand has been doing; it is an export that is related to males, not females. Or if they are females, it will be only a small number. For example, in the area of construction work in the Middle East, where there are 200,000 to 300,000 Thai workers, we are giving too little support to this matter.

Fourth, we should coordinate the interests and bring in ideas from various places for our use more and more. This would be the connecting point between the private sector and the government. We have said that the connecting link between the private sector and the government at this point is the Private and Government Sector Joint Committee (PGJC). Is this committee working at full capacity? Is the Industrial Association, as a representative of the industries, working at full capacity? Is the Thai Bankers Association working at full capacity as a representative of the banks? These are the foundation of the private sector, which has been rather firmly established. They have a firm and secured base to coordinate the power of ideas, the feelings, and the frustrations through an organ, especially, the PGJC. But there is a lack of permanent government officials who comprise an important unit--the bureaucracy, the biggest political party in the whole country. This is the point where we have to reform a little. It could be a reform of the Private and Government Sector Joint Committee so that it becomes a platform for the discussion of joint actions in the future, rather than a place where I would make a complaint. The committee would then turn into a place where complaints are submitted, just as I am a member of parliament who is treated as a person who receives complaints. It would not be a place where opinions are tried and tested, in particular, opinions on ideas that would lead to a policy for working together in the future. This is because, I hope, the future meetings of the committee will coordinate the ideas from the private sector with the ideas from the government side and seek a common ground. As for minor defects, they can be brought up with government officials so that there can be a correction on the system.

The last point is on the stimulation for the creation of a fund for the revival of the economy of the country. If we were to do it with our own strength alone without having to create foreign debts, we would probably not be able to handle it. There have been frequent talks so that if we could induce foreigners to join us in this ritual, it would be best for us. Without doing much, we would only have to admit that there would be more people dropping by to visit with us and chat with us. And it is well known that countries that have hard currencies in the world, such as Japan, Taiwan, or West

Germany, want very much to solve the problems of their own countries, want others to borrow from them, or want to invest in foreign countries. I think that in the future if there is a need for everything to go through the bureaucratic procedures, we will create a process in which there is a direct meeting with the countries that have their plans ready. And the government would be the strength that helps promote the Board of Investment, not to step over the Board of Investment, because this matter is relatively urgent. And if we can say that there is a tendency for those countries to allow their factories to invest in our country, in cases like these, what can we help them with? Or are there things for them to do? And once they have begun, what can we give them for certain? If we can do this without having to go through a process that would take 4 years or 2 years to setup a new stock or center, I think we will be able to see some improvement. And Taiwan can do it beautifully because the products of Taiwan cannot find an outlet in the People's Republic of China, because there is a lot of work that is going through Thailand at present, in which a great number of investors are involved at all times. And so there needs to be a clear policy. And if there is a direct talk between the investors and the government representatives, not just the government officials, problems can be solved.

12282/12948
CSO: 4207/22

BRIEFS

NEW POLITICAL PARTY FORMATIONS--Another political party has been formed in Vanuatu--the third to be launched in less than 2 months. It is the Vanuatu Labor Party and has the backing of the Trade Union Congress [TUC]. The new party is headed by a former secretary general of the TUC, Mr (Kenneth Sartongia). According to a statement issued in Port Vila, the Labor Party has been formed to counter what was described as the class struggle now taking place in Vanuatu. The statement says the party would contest all local and general elections on policies of full employment, justice, and freedom for everyone and economic development. There are now 13 political parties in Vanuatu, most of which make up the opposition union of moderate parties. Labor's launching comes only 24 hours after announcement of the formation of the National Democratic Party and less than 2 months after the establishment of the New People's Party. [Text] [Melbourne Overseas Service in English 0500 GMT 30 Nov 86 BK] /6662

CSO: 4200/183

COALITION GOVERNMENT OF DEMOCRATIC KAMPUCHEA

VODK SAYS PHNOM PENH REGIME LACKS POPULAR SUPPORT

BK210430 (Clandestine) Voice of Democratic Kampuchea in Cambodian 2330 GMT
20 Nov 86

["News Commentary": "International Observers in Phnom Penh Say the
Vietnamese Puppets in Phnom Penh Have No Popular Support"]

[Text] According to various foreign news agencies, the majority of
foreign observers in Phnom Penh say 8 years after being propped up by
the Vietnamese, the Phnom Penh puppets still have to seek support from
people. This shows that they have received no popular support.

Many observers are of the opinion that the Heng Samrin clique lacks
competent people to work among the people in rural areas. Apart from
Phnom Penh, the Heng Samrin group is cut off from the people and various
village and commune administrative staffs. Heng Samrin's people have
done many bad things in implementing their policy in every field. Heng
Samrin himself admitted this real situation. He admitted that his men are
still weak and incompetent; therefore people will not follow their
leadership.

These opinions have exposed the Vietnamese deceitful propaganda which
claims that Vietnam's puppets are strong and in complete control in
Cambodia. The handful of Vietnamese puppets in Phnom Penh is in fact not
a regime, ignorant, and incompetent. These persons only repeat what the
Vietnamese say and carry out Vietnamese orders. The Cambodian people have
thrown these people out of Cambodian society a long time ago and categori-
cally oppose them. Even Cambodian soldiers and administrative personnel
the Vietnamese have partly set up to serve them are vigorously uniting
and opposing the Vietnamese. This has rendered ineffective the shadow
regime propped up by the Vietnamese in Phnom Penh. Cambodians do not need
this Vietnamese-backed regime. Therefore, Vietnam's plan to set up a
puppet regime in Cambodia to cover up its act of aggression has been
shamefully defeated.

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CSO: 4212/11

COALITION GOVERNMENT OF DEMOCRATIC KAMPUCHEA

VODK SAYS HANOI BEHIND EVERYTHING AT LAO CONGRESS

BK220517 (Clandestine) Voice of Democratic Kampuchea in Cambodian 2330 GMT
21 Nov 86

[Station editorial: "Vietnam's Lao Party Congress or, in Other Words, the Vietnamese Party Congress in Laos"]

[Text] 1. Hardly had the Lao party concluded its congress, that is even before Laos had a chance to announce the outcome of its congress, than the Vietnamese authorities started to vociferously publicized from Hanoi reports on the work and results of the Lao Party Congress.

2. In so doing, the Hanoi authorities succeeded only in winning the derision and mockery of opinion, especially those who have closely followed the situation in Vietnam and Laos, and making them feel more sympathetic toward Laos. Why did the people, and especially those who have followed the situation in Vietnam and Laos ridicule and feel fed up with Vietnam? This is because they were well aware of the true nature, the true colors, and the perfidious policy and ambition of the Hanoi authorities.

In fact,

1) The Hanoi authorities hastily publicized news about the Lao Party Congress because they wanted to stress to Laos and the rest of the world that everything connected with the Lao Party Congress was staged, prepared, arranged, and decided by Hanoi and that they can make reports on the congress at will, even before Laos itself; and

2) all work and content of the congress was made ready by the Hanoi authorities and Laos was instructed to do as it was told regarding domestic policy, economic policy, foreign policy, and the appointment of the Central Committee as well as Political Bureau of the Lao party.

3. Through all the above-mentioned arrangements and decisions, it can be clearly seen that the Hanoi authorities are continuing to firmly control Laos regarding domestic policy, economic policy, and foreign policy and particularly its organization from top to the grassroots levels, including

the Political Bureau, the Central Committee, the provincial, district, commune, and village committees, and all ministries and offices. All are kept in the firm iron claws of the Hanoi authorities, iron claws that they have been gradually clamped on Laos over the past decades.

Moreover, the Hanoi authorities also have their own forces in Laos functioning as an iron net to pin Laos in place: namely, 50-60,000 Vietnamese soldiers, the 50-60,000 advisers and experts of all kinds from central to village levels, and the more than 3 million Vietnamese residents, particularly those from Thanh Hoa, Nghe An, Ha Tinh, Quang Binh, and Quang Tri Provinces who are now spread from northern down to southern Laos. These Vietnamese settlers have been sent to colonize Laos, grabbing land and seizing all kinds of economic resources, especially timber in Laos. Moreover, these Vietnamese nationals are applying constant pressure on the Lao people in all fields, first of all in the rural areas where they play the role of controllers and administrators of Lao villages and communes. Armed groups are also set up in villages and communes to suppress the Lao people at the grassroots level throughout Laos. These Vietnamese residents no longer bear such names as Nguyen or Le. They are now more likely known as Ham Deng or Thong Dam. This is part of the rat-swallowing boa policy of the Hanoi authorities regarding Laos. This clearly shows the true nature and true colors of the Hanoi authorities' Indochinese Federation.

Hanoi reveals its true label even in reporting on the Lao party congress showing that it is the one behind the preparations for everything from a one or two-line slogan up. Hanoi did this arrogantly, without shame or humility. It behaves in a way to show to all that it is the paramount master of Laos. This is the point that has made opinion, especially the observers of Vietnamese and Lao affairs come up with this appellation: Vietnam's Lao Party or Vietnamese Party in Laos. It is the most insolent, most despicable, stinking act committed by the Hanoi authorities, despised by the world, and hated and resolutely opposed by the Lao people. For this reason, the world's people greatly sympathize with the Lao people.

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CSO: 4212/11

COALITION GOVERNMENT OF DEMOCRATIC KAMPUCHEA

VOK CITES KPNLF COMMAND REPORT ON CAMBODIAN SITUATION

BK240930 (Clandestine) Voice of the Khmer in Cambodian 0500 GMT 24 Nov 86

["Report by the intelligence unit of the KPNLF Command on the general situation in Cambodia under the administration of Vietnam's Heng Samrin"]

[Text] We note that since early 1986 Vietnam and Heng Samrin have faced greater difficulties than in the previous years although this year they have not launched many attacks along the Cambodian-Thai border. In 1986 problems abound in Cambodia, particularly within the Heng Samrin administration where confusion reigns at almost every level and in every ministry and service:

- a. Among administrative personnel in all ministries, because Vietnam has unreasonably transferred or dismissed some ministers and deputy ministers.
- b. Among the Heng Samrin administrative personnel, because there are splits and a division of power and class between the old and new resistance members. There are two types of old resistance members: those from the Viet Cong and Viet Minh era, and those from 1977.
- c. These two groups are envious of and detest those who have come to power since 1979.
- d. These three groups are competing for power in Phnom Penh.
- e. Resistance members and those with a good educational background do not get along well because most members from the old resistance movement are not well educated.

In addition to this, the Cambodian people in the country do not support Vietnamese soldiers, while the Heng Samrin soldiers also do not get along well with Vietnamese troops and only wait for an opportunity or an excuse to quarrel with them. In 1986, Heng Samrin soldiers frequently clashed with Vietnamese troops, such as in the provinces of Siem Reap, Battambang, Pursat, and Kompong Speu. Furthermore, the Vietnamese troops have faced difficulties in searching for the resistance fighters in various provinces since the beginning of this year. This search is still going on. The results have not been good for the Vietnamese this year because the

resistance fighters have already infiltrated deep inside the country, such as in Pursat, Battambang, Kompong Chhnang, Siem Reap, Kompong Thom, Kompong Cham, and Kratie provinces, among others. Therefore, the Vietnamese forces find themselves divided between their attempts to check the resistance fighters' infiltration, oppose the resistance fighters along the Cambodian-Thai border, and defend major strongholds such as townships and provincial seats.

Another problem which is causing increasing headaches for the Vietnamese is that a number of projects to be implemented by Heng Samrin officials between 1983 and 1986 are being revised because they have not achieved good results, such as the "Kar-5" [Cambodian alphabet], "Sar-5," "Kar-Tar-55" projects and others. Only 50 percent of these three projects' goals [have] been achieved. Many other projects started by Vietnam have not produced good results. Furthermore, some projects started between 1983 and 1986 have not yet been implemented, such as the plan to expel Cambodian people from towns in the provinces of Kompong Cham and Kandal, and from Phnom Penh to rural areas in the countryside. Another project Vietnam has ordered the Heng Samrin administration to implement since 1983 involves the inclusion of Vietnamese nationals into wards and districts throughout Cambodia to be looked after by Cambodian people. This plan has not produced any results because Heng Samrin officials have refused to cooperate with Vietnam's plan.

This year in particular, Heng Samrin officials and the Cambodian people throughout the country have been opposing Vietnamese forces in almost every way possible. This year, Vietnam plans to implement three new programs in Battambang Province's Bavel, Balang, and Ek Phnum Districts. There is a plan to set up a new sub-province in Battambang, namely Sisophon sub-province which comprises five districts: Sisophon, Phnum Srok, Preah Net Preah, Thmar Puok, and O Chreou. People in the Sisophon district seat will be divided into three groups and relocated:

- a. Along Route 6 from Sala Krau village to [words indistinct];
- b. Along Route 69 from Svay Chek to Thmar Puok; and
- c. Along Route 5 from Phsae Soeng village to the border of Mongkolborei District.

This is a review of many uncompleted projects begun since 1983. Vietnam keeps planning new projects to be implemented by Heng Samrin officials, but this will only create more difficulties for Vietnam in its organizational and planning task of trying to get people to implement them. There are, of course, many other tasks which have to be carried out, and this will certainly bring more problems for the Vietnamese at the end of 1986 and early next year.

There have been disagreements between soldiers and civilian officials in the Heng Samrin regime. Almost 90 percent of the people no longer lend their support. The dry season is the time to launch military operations. The economies of Vietnam and Cambodia are worsening to the point that the people have almost nothing to eat. This is just one aspect of the problems in Cambodia. How many more problems will fall on the Hanoi Vietnamese leaders' shoulders?

In north Vietnam, there are shortages of everything. China is applying the strongest pressure. In south Vietnam, freedom fighters are beginning to make their presence felt. These are just some points which will cause problems for Vietnam. Vietnam itself has admitted that there are many major economic, political, and diplomatic tasks which will cause great difficulties for Vietnam in 1986 and in 1987.

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CSO: 4212/11

COALITION GOVERNMENT OF DEMOCRATIC KAMPUCHEA

VOK CITES REPORT ON SITUATION OF SRV TROOPS

BK280420 (Clandestine) Voice of the Khmer in Cambodian 0500 GMT 26 Nov 86

[Article from "Report of Intelligence Unit Attached to the KPNLF Command on Situation of Vietnamese Forces in Cambodia"]

[Text] The article says that in 1984, 1985, and 1986, Vietnam dispatched six divisions to the Cambodian-Thai border and stationed four Heng Samrin divisions in the area. Vietnamese and Heng Samrin forces, with a combined strength of 10 divisions, are deployed from the provinces of Koh Kong and Pursat to Preah Vihear. In May 1986, Vietnamese and Heng Samrin authorities set up a division of militiamen, called S-16, which is in charge of defending the border replacing Vietnamese-Heng Samrin soldiers who were withdrawn into the interior of the country to defend major districts and townships. The divisions stationed along the Cambodian-Thai border are as follows:

In Pursat and Koh Kong Provinces, there are two regiments of Vietnam's F-330th division and a regiment of the F-7th division. At Phnum Bak position in Sisophon, is Vietnam's F-9th division; at Kamping Puoy hill position, Vietnam's F-59th division; at Chup-Preah Net Preah, Vietnam's F-75th division; in Samraong Chongkal, Vietnam's F-72d division; in Preah Vihear-Choam Khsan, Vietnam's F-57th division; in Pailin, Heng Samrin's F-1st division; in Toek Sap, Heng Samrin's F-6th division; in Vouk Khvav-Svay Check, Heng Samrin's F-4th division; and in Oddar Meanchey, Heng Samrin's F-3d division.

All these Vietnamese-Heng Samrin soldiers along the Cambodian-Thai border total 10 divisions; however, these units are not at full strength. These Vietnamese-Heng Samrin soldiers face the following problems:

1. Desertion to Vietnam and defection to Cambodian resistance fighters;
2. Dead and wounded combatants and those affected by malaria and other diseases;
3. Insufficient supplies and shortages of everything, such as too low a salary, not enough food to eat, no medicine, shortage of clothing;

4. Low morale because of the dictatorship of Vietnamese and Heng Samrin authorities in recruiting soldiers, including tricking youths and school children and forcing people to serve in the army.

These four problems have caused additional headaches for Vietnamese leaders and the Heng Samrin regime. Furthermore, the Vietnamese-Heng Samrin authorities have difficulties in arresting defectors. Through their sheer numbers, arrested defectors have caused further problems for the authorities who have difficulty punishing them and providing them food. As for war invalids, both Vietnamese and Heng Samrin, nobody cares for them. Therefore, these invalids behave erratically; they lob grenades and carry out robberies because they are disillusioned and think that no one cares about them. Thus, various townships, such as Phnom Penh, are frequently victims of grenade attacks by war invalids.

What are Vietnam's goals in bringing reinforcements to the Cambodia-Thai border, digging a trench along the border, planting mines and punji stakes, and fencing it with barbed wire? The pretext for this is to prevent the infiltration by Cambodian resistance fighters. However, Vietnam's efforts for many years have yielded no result. Nationalist forces and resistance fighters can still operate in Cambodia, and not only along the border but also from 100 to 400 km inside the country. That is why at the end of 1986 Vietnam pulled back some of its troops from the Cambodian-Thai border to defend some major district and provincial townships. However, despite the current arrangement of the Vietnamese-Heng Samrin forces, Vietnam will certainly face further problems in 1986-87.

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CSO: 4212/11

COALITION GOVERNMENT OF DEMOCRATIC KAMPUCHEA

VONADK BATTLE REPORT FOR 21-27 NOV

BK291410 [Editorial Report] (Clandestine) Voice of the National Army of Democratic Kampuchea, VONADK, in Cambodia monitored by Bangkok Bureau during the reporting period 21-27 November carried the following battle reports:

VONADK at 2315 GMT on 21 November reports that in their activities against the Vietnamese aggressors on the South Phnom Penh, Kompong Cham, Kompong Thom, South Battambang, Samlot, Route 4, East Battambang, and South Sisophon battlefields, the DK National Army and guerrillas killed or wounded 85 Vietnamese soldiers, destroyed 14 guns, dismantled 1 commune and 14 village administrations, destroyed a truck, 3 barracks, and some war materiel, seized 29 guns and some war materiel, and liberated 8 villages on the Kompong Cham battlefield.

VONADK at 2315 GMT on 22 November reports that the DK National Army and guerrillas launched activities against the Vietnamese aggressors on the Kratie, Kompong Thom, North Battambang, Northwest Phnom Penh, Kompong Cham, and Sisophon battlefields between 12 and 19 November, killing or wounding 66 enemy soldiers, destroying 28 assorted weapons, 12 village administrations, 2 trucks, 6 barracks, and some war materiel, seizing 14 weapons and some ammunition and war materiel, and freeing and sending home 25 commune militiamen on the Kompong Thom battlefield.

VONADK at 2315 GMT on 23 November reports that the DK National Army and guerrillas launched activities against the Vietnamese aggressors on the North Sisophon, South Battambang, Kompong Som, Pailin, East Battambang, and Kompong Thom battlefields between 1 and 18 November, killing or wounding 86 Vietnamese soldiers, including 1 regiment commander and 2 battalion commanders who were killed on the Pailin battlefield, dismantling 1 commune and 3 village administrations, destroying 37 weapons, a commune office building, 2 trucks, 2 paddy storehouses, a C-25 field radio, 8 barracks, and some ammunition and war materiel, seizing 3 guns and some war materiel, and liberating 14 villages and 76 fraternal Cambodian soldiers along with 150 inhabitants on the North Sisophon battlefield.

VONADK at 2315 GMT on 24 November reports that the DK National Army and guerrillas conducted various activities against the Vietnamese aggressors on the Siem Reap, West Battambang, Kompong Thom, Oddar Meanchey, Sisophon,

Leach, and East Battambang battlefields between 8 and 22 November, killing or wounding 47 Vietnamese soldiers, dismantling 2 village administrations, destroying 2 trucks, a 3 meters-long bridge, and some war materiel, and seizing a quantity of war materiel.

VONADK at 2315 GMT on 25 November reports that the DK National Army and guerrillas in their various activities against the Vietnamese aggressors on the Northwest Phnom Penh, East Kompong Cham, Kompong Cham, South Battambang, Stung Treng, Kompong Thom, Battambang, and Western Leach battlefields between 13 and 21 November killed or wounded 45 Vietnamese soldiers, dismantled 4 village and 1 commune administrations, destroyed 6 guns, a commune office building, 8 barracks, an ammunition depot, 250 meters of railroad track, and some war materiel, seized some war materiel, and liberated 6 villages on the Northwest Phnom Penh battlefield and 3 others on the East Kompong Cham battlefield.

VONADK at 2315 GMT on 26 November reports that the DK National Army and guerrillas attacked the Vietnamese aggressors on the Northwest Phnom Penh, Siem Reap, Route 4, Kampot, Samlot, Kompong Speu, Kompong Som, North Sisophon, Sisophon, and Western Leach battlefields between 5 and 23 November, killing or wounding 175 Vietnamese soldiers, including 2 battalion commanders and 2 company commanders who were killed in ambushes, destroying 20 assorted guns, dismantling 20 village administrations, knocking out 3 cars and damaging 2 others, destroying 2 garrisons and some war materiel, seizing 2 guns, a boat, and some ammunition and war materiel, and liberating 9 villages, 30 village and commune militiamen, and 28 inhabitants on the Siem Reap battlefield.

VONADK at 2315 GMT on 27 November reports the DK National Army and guerrillas attacked the Vietnamese aggressors on the Kompong Som, Kompong Thom, Kompong Chhnang, MOUNG, North Sisophon, Kompong Cham, East Battambang, West Battambang, and Sisophon battlefields between 10 and 23 November, killing or wounding 54 Vietnamese soldiers, dismantling 2 village and 1 commune administrations, destroying 4 weapons, a truck, 5 barracks, and some war materiel, and liberating 5 villages on the Kompong Thom battlefield.

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CSO: 4212/11

COALITION GOVERNMENT OF DEMOCRATIC KAMPUCHEA

BRIEFS

44 VIETNAMESE KILLED IN SIEM REAP--A report from the ANS command says that ANS soldiers killed 44, wounded 34, and took 3 Vietnamese prisoners in a fierce clash last week in Srei Snam District, Siem Reap Province. The report says that on 13 November, ANS combatants from the 5th Division, in cooperation with a commandos from the 7th, 41st, and 4th Regiments, launched a major attack against a Vietnamese position in Beng commune, Srei Snam District, Siem Reap Province. The report also says the attack lasted for 25 minutes, resulting in 44 Vietnamese soldiers killed, 34 wounded, and 3 taken prisoner; a quantity of weapons was seized and 3 ammunition depots and 12 barracks were destroyed. The report does not specify ANS loss of life. [Text] [(Clandestine) Voice of the Khmer in Cambodian 0500 GMT 24 Nov 86] /9604

MESSAGE FROM MALAYSIAN FOREIGN MINISTER--Khieu Samphan, vice president of Democratic Kampuchea in charge of foreign affairs, recently received a message from His Excellency Datuk Rais bin Yatim, foreign minister of Malaysia, thanking the vice president for his greetings message on Malaysian National Day. The message read as follows: His Excellency Khieu Samphan, vice president of Democratic Kampuchea: On behalf of the Malaysian Government and people and in my own name, I am glad to express profound thanks for the best wishes and warm greetings extended to us by the CGDK and the Cambodian people on the National Day of Malaysia. Availing myself of this occasion, I would like to reaffirm Your Excellency of our resolution to make further efforts for peace and stability in our region. Please accept my highest regards. [Signed] Datuk Rais bin Yatim, foreign minister of Malaysia. [Text] [(Clandestine) Voice of Democratic Kampuchea in Cambodian 2330 GMT 23 Nov 86] /9604

CSO: 4212/11

PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KAMPUCHEA

BOU THANG RECEIVES BULGARIAN AMBASSADOR

BK240615 Phnom Penh Domestic Service in Cambodian 0430 GMT 24 Nov 86

[Text] Comrade Bou Thang, member of the KPRP Central Committee Political Bureau, vice chairman of the Council of Ministers, and minister of national defense, received Comrade Leon Yossifov Beraha, new Bulgarian ambassador to Cambodia, on the afternoon of 20 November.

Comrade Bou Thang joyfully spoke about the current military situation marked by our growing position of strength and victory over the enemies. He said: The entire people and army have cooperated in building the border defense networks--a significant contribution to our strategy in opposing the enemies. The enemies' maneuvers have been timely smashed by the KPRAF in cooperation with the Vietnamese volunteers.

The comrade also noted the constant growth of the bond of solidarity, friendship, and cooperation between Cambodia and Bulgaria. He said that despite some difficulties, the entire party, entire army, and all Cambodian people are happily implementing the resolution of the Fifth Party Congress to defend and build the country toward socialism.

In his speech, Comrade Leon Yossifov Beraha expressed great joy over the growing relation between our two armies and stressed that this relation will certainly grow further. He said: We voice support for the fraternal friendship between the Cambodian and Vietnamese armies and the friendship of the three Indochinese countries. The Bulgarian party, government, and people fully support the three Indochinese countries' struggle aimed at building a zone of peace, stability, and good neighborliness.

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CSO: 4212/11

PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KAMPUCHEA

CHEA SIM RECEIVES ISLAMIC CONFERENCE DELEGATION

BK250945 Phnom Penh Domestic Service in Cambodian 0430 GMT 25 Nov 86

[Text] On the morning of 24 November, Comrade Chea Sim, member of the Political Bureau of the KPRP Central Committee and chairman of the National Assembly and the KUFNCD National Council, received the delegation from the Islamic Conference Organization [ICO] led by (Ezabit Nasser), member of the ICO Executive Committee.

Speaking on the occasion, Comrade Chea Sim welcomed the visit of the delegation to the PRK. The comrade described the great destruction that was savagely brought upon the Cambodian people by the genocidal regime of Pol Pot during more than 3 years and 8 months. The comrade stressed that under the astute leadership of the KPRP and with the timely assistance of the fraternal Vietnamese party, state, government, and people, the Pol Pot genocidal regime was definitively toppled on 7 January 1979. Comrade Chea Sim said that with the moral and assistance support from Vietnam, Laos, the Soviet Union, fraternal socialist countries, and progressive countries the world over, the PRK is currently defending revolutionary gains and rapidly restoring and rebuilding revolutionary establishments.

Replying, (Ezabit Nasser) highly appreciated the rapid all-round development of the Cambodian people during the past almost 8 years. He said he will report the real situation and the Cambodian people's just struggle to the Arab people. (Ezabit Nasser) affirmed that he will assist the PRK in building schools and hospitals and training Cambodian technicians.

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CSO: 4212/11

PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KAMPUCHEA

HUN SEN ADDRESSES CLOSING HEALTH SECTOR MEETING

BK280729 Phnom Penh Domestic Service in Cambodian 1200 GMT 27 Nov 86

[Text] A ceremony was held at the health minister's office in the afternoon of 26 November to close the eighth health care summation and emulation meeting of 1986 after 3 days of work in the presence of Comrade Hun Sen, member of the KPRP Central Committee Political Bureau and chairman of the Council of Ministers. During this meeting, the participants joined heads in discussing in detail all the achievements made by the health sector and a number of shortcomings to rectify, and in taking measures to be implemented in 1987 and in the coming years as part of the efforts to carry out the first 5-year plan set by the fifth party congress. The meeting participants also heard reports presented by 13 units from the central and grassroots levels. They also paid a working visit to the Kien Svay Health Center, the Prek Eng Commune clinic, and Robas Angkanh village in Prek Eng commune, Kien Svay District.

Through the discussion, a number of outstanding units were selected. The meeting also decided to confer the Council of Ministers' rotary banner to the health service of Battambang Province, the Health Ministry's summation banners on eight units, and citation certificates and letters on 21 other units.

Speaking on that occasion, Comrade Hun Sen, member of the party Central Committee Political Bureau and chairman of the Council of Ministers, highly appreciated the achievements scored by the health sector in the past years, stressing that this sector is an important key activity of the Cambodian revolutionary organization as the national reconstruction efforts require that the people be healthy, physically strong, and mentally stable so that they can be conscious and resolute enough to fight for the construction of a socialist society. Therefore, all concerned must firmly grasp, and have the determination to implement, the policy of the party and state by wholeheartedly struggling without any reservation to build, protect, and strengthen our health network.

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CSO: 4212/11

PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KAMPUCHEA

CHEA SIM, MAT LY VISIT SUBURBAN TEXTILE MILL

BK270656 Phnom Penh Domestic Service in Cambodian 0430 GMT 27 Nov 86

[Text] On the afternoon of 26 November, Comrade Chea Sim, member of the KPRP Central Committee Political Bureau and chairman of the National Assembly and of the KUFNCD National Council, accompanied by Comrade Mat Ly, member of the KPRP Central Committee Political Bureau, vice chairman of the National Assembly, and chairman of the Kampuchean Federation of Trade Unions, paid a visit to cadres, employees, and workers at Pochentong's textile mill No 1.

Chatting with the workers, Comrade Chea Sim expressed satisfaction with the high rate of production achieved by the workers in turning out more than 1,006,000 meters of cloth from the beginning of the year to 25 November. This was made possible thanks to the efforts of our workers to carry out the common strategic tasks of restoring and developing the socioeconomic sector of the Cambodian revolution. Comrade Chea Sim went on to say that the industrial foundations that escaped destruction by the genocidal clique have now been repaired and reopened by our technicians to produce consumer goods and promote export.

He also noted the gradual building of the material and technical foundations for the advance toward socialism. He stressed the steady improvement of the people's living conditions, and urged all workers to make greater efforts to overcome temporary difficulties in the progress toward bringing about an advanced economy.

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CSO: 4212/11

REPORTAGE ON AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENTS

17-23 Nov

BK250837 [Editorial Report] Cambodian media monitored by Bangkok Bureau carried the following reports on agricultural developments during the reporting period 17-23 November:

National level: Phnom Penh SPK in English at 1100 GMT on 22 November transmits the following report: In the past three quarters of this year, Cambodia exported nearly 5,000 metric tons of beans worth over one million rubles to some socialist countries, including Vietnam, Laos, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and the GDR. Last year Cambodia sold to foreign countries nearly 6,000 metric tons of beans earning 814,132 rubles and 387,300 U.S. dollars. In the 1985 monsoon, bean cultivation throughout the country was done on 35,580 hectares with an output of 26,480 metric tons, including 13,000 metric tons of soybean. In the just-ended monsoon season, bean cultivation was done on 25,400 hectares, including 18,000 hectares of green beans. Kompong Cham and Battambang Provinces lead with 16,600 hectares and 2,300 hectares respectively. Last year, 13,260 metric tons of beans were sold to the state while in the first three quarters of this year 3,500 metric tons were sold.

Kratie Province: Phnom Penh Domestic Service in Cambodian at 1300 GMT on 17 November reports that by mid-October, peasants in the province had transplanted more than 1,380 hectares of dry season rice. SPK in English at 1108 GMT on 17 November reports that in the just-ended monsoon season, peasants in Sambo District had planted 5,200 hectares of rice and 550 hectares of corn, cassava, beans, sugar cane, sesame, and vegetables; there are 18,600 head of cattle in the province. Phnom Penh radio in Cambodian at 1300 GMT on 20 November reports that by mid-October, peasants in Prek Prasap District had transplanted more than 300 hectares of dry-season rice and planted more than 220 hectares of subsidiary crops. At 1115 GMT on 22 November SPK in French reports that during the first 10 months of this year peasants in the province had sold to the state 530 metric tons of tobacco.

Kompong Som City: According to Phnom Penh radio at 1300 GMT on 17 November, fishermen in the city have so far caught 1,200 metric tons of fish and 234 metric tons of other sea products.

Kompong Thom Province: In a report broadcast at 1300 GMT on 17 November, Phnom Penh radio says that the provincial trade service plans to buy 23,000 metric tons of paddy and collect 4,000 metric tons of patriotic contribution from peasants in the 1986-87 season. According to SPK in French at 0412 GMT on 23 November, during the last rainy season, peasants in the province had transplanted more than 102,737 hectares of rice and planted 6,137 hectares of subsidiary crops.

Pursat Province: SPK in French at 1203 GMT on 17 November reports that peasants in Phnum Kravanh District are currently transplanting the remaining 250 hectares of rainy season rice and 50 hectares of dry season rice.

Prey Veng Province: SPK in English at 1119 GMT on 17 November reports that in the just-ended rainy season peasants in the province had transplanted 210,000 hectares of rice and planted 9,000 hectares of subsidiary crops. In another report in French at 0412 GMT on 20 November SPK says that more than 10,600 hectares of subsidiary crops have so far been planted in the province and that another 6,000 hectares are planned for this dry season.

Kompong Speu Province: Phnom Penh radio at 1300 GMT on 20 November reports that by 11 November, peasants in Phnum Srouch District had retilled more than 5,780 hectares of land; sowed more than 870 hectares of rice; broadcast and transplanted more than 5,460 hectares of rice; and planted more than 640 hectares of subsidiary crops.

Kompong Cham Province: According to SPK in English at 0446 GMT on 19 November, by early November peasants in the province had harvested 9,170 hectares of dibbling rice with an average yield of one metric ton per hectare and 8,800 hectares of 12-36 rice with an average yield of 2.5 metric tons per hectare.

Kompong Chhnang Province: In a report in English at 1119 GMT on 17 November SPK says that during the past rainy season, peasants in the province planted 45,335 hectares of rice, an increase of 9,000 hectares over 1985.

Siem Reap-Oddar Meanchey Province: SPK in English at 1119 GMT on 17 November reports that in the just-ended monsoon season, peasants in Chong Tal District had transplanted 3,300 hectares of rice, including 468 hectares of short-term rice and 1,700 hectares of medium-term rice.

Kandal Province: At 0446 GMT on 19 November, SPK in English reports that due to unfavorable weather conditions, in the just-ended monsoon season peasants in Phnum Penh District had planted only 8,300 hectares of rice or 89 percent of the plan. In another report in French at 0412 GMT on 20 November SPK says that so far peasants in the district have harvested 550 hectares of early rice and are continuing transplanting 500 hectares of rice of the 1,000 hectares planned for this dry season. According to

a report in English at 1100 GMT on 21 November SPK says that in the just-ended monsoon season, peasants in the province planted 14,500 hectares of intensive rice with Kandal Stoeng District leading with 6,000 hectares followed by S'ang, Phnum Penh, and Kien Svay Districts.

Svay Rieng Province: According to SPK in French at 0412 GMT on 20 November, by the beginning of November peasants in the province had harvested more than 8,800 hectares of the 136,500 hectares of short-term rice with an average yield of one metric ton per hectare.

24-30 Nov

BK011003 [Editorial Report] Cambodian media monitored by Bangkok Bureau carried the following reports on agricultural developments during the reporting period 24-30 November:

National level: Phnom Penh SPK in French at 1133 GMT on 24 November reports that last rainy season, peasants throughout the country planted more than 91,600 hectares of subsidiary food and industrial crops. SPK in English at 1101 GMT on 25 November reports that last dry season, 11,200 hectares of tobacco were planted throughout the country. The biggest tobacco growers in Cambodia are Kompong Cham, Kandal, and Kratie Provinces with 3,720, 1,450, and 234 hectares respectively. In the first 10 months of this year, peasants had sold 5,180 tons of tobacco to the state. Of these, 830 tons were exported to foreign countries, especially Vietnam, Bulgaria, and the GDR.

Kandal Province: Phnom Penh Domestic Service in Cambodian at 0430 GMT on 29 November reports that in the 1986-87 dry season peasants in Leuk Dek District plan to grow 3,000 hectares of dry season and floating rice and that from 1 to 13 November nearly 200 hectares of land had been retilled and 130 hectares of rice sowed. At 0403 GMT on 27 November SPK in French reports that by mid-November, peasants in Ponhea Loe District had planted 60 of the 3,500 hectares of IR-36 rice planned for this dry season.

Takeo Province: According to Phnom Penh radio at 1300 GMT on 24 November, by 13 November peasants in the province had sowed more than 240 hectares of rice and transplanted 520 hectares of rice.

Kompong Chhnang Province: In a report broadcast at 1300 GMT on 25 November, the radio says that last rainy season peasants in the province broadcast and transplanted almost 53,600 hectares of rice, including more than 7,100 hectares of intensive rice, and planted more than 2,800 hectares of subsidiary crops and almost 600 hectares of industrial crops.

Kratie Province: According to SPK in English at 1114 GMT on 26 November, in September alone, peasants in Prek Prasap District sold to the state 400 metric tons of corn and 200 metric tons of sesame.

Battambang Province: Phnom Penh radio at 0430 GMT on 26 November reports that this monsoon season, peasants in Sangke District put more than 16,400 hectares under rice, or 65 percent of the plan, and covered more than 600 hectares with subsidiary and industrial crops and adds that 350 hectares of dry season rice are planned for this year. SPK in English at 1114 GMT on 26 November reports that this year, peasants in the province plan to sell 124,000 metric tons of rice to the state. In a report in French at 0403 GMT on 27 November SPK says that peasants in the province have already started planting 1,500 hectares of dry season rice planned for this year and that local authorities have provided to peasants 50 metric tons of chemical fertilizers. The report adds that in 1985 peasants in the province planted more than 1,400 hectares of dry season rice with an average yield of two metric tons per hectare.

Kompong Cham Province: Phnom Penh radio at 1300 GMT on 26 November reports that this rainy season peasants in Tbong Khmum District transplanted more than 2,800 hectares of rice. In another report broadcast at 0430 GMT on 28 November the radio says that in the 1985 dry season, peasants in Chanka Leu District broadcast and transplanted more than 5,480 hectares of various types of rice and planted more than 420 hectares of corn, more than 10 hectares of potatoes, more than 4,320 hectares of mung beans, more than 16 hectares of peanuts, more than 1,040 hectares of sesame, more than 5,180 hectares of soybeans, and more than 450 hectares of cotton.

Siem Reap-Oddar Meanchey Province: Phnom Penh radio at 0430 GMT on 27 November reports that last rainy season peasants in Svay Leu District transplanted more than 2,300 hectares of rice, including 540 hectares of dibbling rice, and planted more than 210 hectares of short-term subsidiary crops.

Kompong Som city: According to SPK in English at 1059 GMT on 24 November so far, fishermen in the city have netted 1,200 metric tons of fish, 150 metric tons of shrimp, 80 metric tons of crab, and 54 metric tons of squid. Phnom Penh radio at 1300 GMT on 27 November reports that so far, the local agriculture service has sold more than 17 metric tons of intensive rice seeds and almost 127 metric tons of chemical fertilizers to peasants. In another report broadcast at 0430 GMT on 30 November, the radio says that the city trade service plans to buy 300 metric tons of paddy from peasants this 1986-87 season. At 1300 GMT on 30 November the radio reports that from early October to mid-November, peasants in Prey Sap District transplanted more than 46 hectares of dry season rice.

Phnom Penh city: In a report broadcast at 0430 GMT on 29 November the radio says that the city's trade service could buy only 118 metric tons of paddy at the 1986-87 season and collect more than 91 percent of the 147 metric tons of patriotic contribution.

1986.

CSG: 321711

PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KAMPUCHEA

BRIEFS

CPSU INTERNATIONAL DEPARTMENT DELEGATION--Min Khin, deputy secretary general of the KUFNCD National Council and secretary general of the PRK-USSR Friendship Association, received on 14 November a delegation from the CPSU Central Committee's International Department led by (A. Bokelev), official in charge of work in the department. Min Khin expressed profound gratitude to the Soviet party, government, and people for assistance to Cambodia. The head of the delegation highly valued the all-round development scored by the Cambodian revolution and reiterated Soviet support for Cambodian people's just struggle against imperialism and Cambodian reactionaries. [Summary] [Phnom Penh Domestic Service in Cambodian 1300 GMT 16 Nov 86] /9604

SOVIET PHOTO EXHIBITION--On the morning of 17 November at the Wat Phnum exhibition hall, the Information and Education Ministry cooperated with the Soviet Embassy to Cambodia in opening a photo exhibition to mark the 27th CPSU Congress and the 69th anniversary of the great socialist October Revolution. Ros Ren, head of the mass culture department of the Information and Culture Ministry, outlined the significance of the October Revolution and thanked the CPSU for its assistance and support to Cambodia. Deputy Information Minister Chey Sophea and Razdukev opened the exhibition. [Summary] [Phnom Penh Domestic Service in Cambodian 1300 GMT 18 Nov 86] /9604

SIEM REAP RETURNEES--During the first 9 months of this year, 194 misled persons, including a battalion commander of the Pol Pot army, turned themselves in to authorities in Sot Nikom District of Siem Reap-Oddar Meanchey Province. They brought along 168 assorted weapons. [Summary] [Phnom Penh Domestic Service in Cambodian 0430 GMT 24 Nov 86] /9604

RETURNEES IN SIEM REAP-ODDAR MEANCHEY--Between 21 September and 20 October, 145 misled persons returned to the fold in Siem Reap-Oddar Meanchey Province, bringing 110 assorted weapons and a lot of mines, grenades, and ammunition. Among the returnees were 56 Sereika soldiers and 41 Pol Pot soldiers. [Excerpt] [Phnom Penh Domestic Service in Cambodian 1300 GMT 24 Nov 86] /9604

KPRAF'S WEEKLY ACTIONS--Last week, our KPRAF comrades-in-arms were successful in 34 operations against the intruding bandits by putting out of action 166 of them, including 52 killed on the spot, 16 captured, 12 wounded, 36 forced to surrender, and 50 who surrendered of their free will. We seized 63 assorted weapons, 4 mines, 4 [word indistinct], and 10 oxen. As a result of the proselytization campaign, and also because of the difficulties they experienced in getting food and medicine, 36 misled persons surrendered to our revolutionary authorities in various localities last week, bringing with them 17 assorted weapons. [Excerpts] [Phnom Penh Domestic Service in Cambodian 1200 GMT 27 Nov 86] /9604

ALBANIAN PARTY FIRST SECRETARY GREETED--Comrade Heng Samrin, general secretary of the KPRP Central Committee, recently sent a message to Comrade Ramiz Alia on his election as first secretary of the Albanian Workers Party [AWP] Central Committee. The message reads: On behalf of the KPRP Central Committee and in my own name, I have the honor to send to you my warmest congratulations. I wish you the best of health and success in your noble task. Under your enlightened and wise leadership, the Albanian working class and people will make more and greater achievements in the implementation of the Ninth AWP Congress resolutions and the 1986-90 eighth 5-year plan. May the fraternal bonds of militant friendship between our two parties and peoples further develop and strengthen. [Text] [Phnom Penh Domestic Service in Cambodian 0430 GMT 28 Nov 86] /9604

RED CROSS ACTIVITY--At the beginning of November, the Cambodian Red Cross from the World Food Program organization, to 1,400 families in Prey Veng Province. [as received] The Cambodian Red Cross cooperated closely with the local authorities in distributing this gift by donating it to 320 families in the provincial capital, 80 families in Baphnum District, and 1,000 families in Kamchay Mea District. [Text] [Phnom Penh Domestic Service in Cambodian 0430 GMT 28 Nov 86] /9604

CSO: 4212/11

VAN TIEN DUNG GREETINGS ON CUBAN ARMY DAY

OW021025 Hanoi VNA in English 0811 GMT 2 Dec 86

[Text] Hanoi, 1 Dec (VNA)--Defense Minister Gen Van Tien Dung has sent greetings to his Cuban counterpart Gen Raul Castro Ruz on the 30th founding anniversary of the Cuban Armed Forces (2 Dec). Gen Van Tien Dung's message says:

"We are elated at and proud of the brilliant achievements you have recorded in many fields. We have always stood by your side and resolutely supported the heroic Cuban people's revolutionary struggle. We believe that the Cuban people and their revolutionary armed forces, with their strong will and revolutionary creativeness, will successfully implement the historic resolution put forth by the third congress of the Cuban Communist Party".

After denouncing the U.S. imperialists for accelerating the arms race and causing tension in Latin America as well as in other parts of the world, the message hails the Cuban Armed Forces' high vigilance and combat readiness to foil all the imperialist schemes and acts of aggression, in defense of their country, an outpost of the socialist community in the western hemisphere, and of peace and security in Latin America and in the world over.

It expresses sincere thanks to the Cuban people and armed forces for their wholehearted and valuable support to the Vietnamese people and armed forces in the revolutionary struggle in the past as well as in the present national construction and defense.

The message wishes for the further consolidation and development of the friendship, militant solidarity and fraternal cooperation between the two peoples and armies.

/9738

CSO: 4200/189

NHAN DAN MARKS CUBAN ARMED FORCES ANNIVERSARY

OW020939 Hanoi VNA in English 0708 GMT 2 Dec 86

[Text] Hanoi, 2 Dec (VNA)--The constant growth and development of the Cuban Revolutionary Armed Forces is a firm guarantee for the Cuban people's peaceful labor and a great encouragement to the nations who are struggling for national independence, democracy and social progress, notes NHAN DAN in a commentary today marking the 30th founding [anniversary] of the Cuban Revolutionary Armed Forces (2 Dec).

The paper goes on: "Over the past three decades, under the leadership of the Communist Party of Cuba, the Cuban people and their revolutionary armed forces have firmly defended their sovereignty, territorial integrity while building a new, free life, bringing far-reaching changes to their country. The Cuban revolution has constantly been consolidated and developed in all fields.

"In face of the Cuban revolution's ever greater prestige and influence, Washington has left no stone unturned to sabotage the Cuban people's national construction and defense: imposing an economic and diplomatic blockade, conducting psychological warfare repeatedly violating Cuban's sovereignty and even plotting to assassinate its leaders... recently, Washington has increased its smear campaign against Cuba, with intent to create an artificial crisis to invade Cuban militarily.

"Cuba's voice on international forums on such issues as the fight against imperialism, colonialism, apartheid, zionism, and economic exploitation by capitalism and for establishment of a new international economic order, has found warm responses the world over, especially from nations struggling for peace, national independence, democracy and social progress".

"The Cuban people's revolutionary cause and the heroic exploits of the Cuban revolutionary armed forces are great encouragement to the Vietnamese people and their armed forces," the paper points out in conclusion.

/9738

CSO: 4200/189

PARTY, STATE LEADERS GREET 11TH LPDR NATIONAL DAY

BK011141 Hanoi International Service in English 1000 GMT 1 Dec 86

[Text] Vietnamese party and state leaders Monday [1 December] sent a message of greetings to their Lao counterparts on the 11th national day of the LPDR, 1 December.

The message highly appreciated the great achievements of the Lao people during the past 11 years. It said: The results of the Fourth Congress of the LPDR held recently demonstrated the unanimity and determination of the entire Lao party and people in implementing the important tasks, leading the country to socialism, and firmly defending the country.

The message said: The Vietnamese will try their best to preserve, consolidate, and develop the special relationship between Laos and Vietnam as well as the militant alliance of the three Indochinese countries for the cause of building and defending each country and for peace and stability in Southeast Asia, Asia, the Pacific, and the rest of the world.

The message also sincerely thanked the Lao party, government, and people of all nationalities for their precious support and assistance for the Vietnamese people's revolutionary cause.

/9738

CSO: 4200/189

BRIEFS

SOVIET LATVIAN DELEGATION VISIT--Hanoi, 2 Dec (VNA)--A delegation of the Latvian Soviet Socialist Republic headed by B.I. Songayla, vice chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR and chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Latvian Republic, has paid a two-week visit here and attended "Soviet days in Vietnam". During its stay, the Soviet guests had working sessions with cadres of the Central Committee of the Vietnam-USSR Friendship Association and took part in cultural and artistic activities in several cities and provinces. On 1 December, they were received by Nguyen Thanh Binh, secretary of the Communist Party of Vietnam Central Committee and secretary of the Hanoi Party organization. He highly appreciated the Latvian delegation's activities in Vietnam to promote the solidarity and cooperation between the Vietnamese and Soviet peoples. [Text] [Hanoi VNA in English 0713 GMT 2 Dec 86 OW] /9738

ALLEGED ATTACK BY SRV--Hanoi, 3 Dec (VNA)--Radio Beijing (China) yesterday quoted a spokesman for the Thai Navy's allegation that in the morning of 30 November, Vietnamese troops fired 70 artillery shells on four areas in Thailand's Chanthaburi Province, and that in the evening the same day a group of the Vietnamese Army crossed the border into Trat Province and exchanged fire with Thai Marines there. Vietnam News Agency is authorized to flatly reject the fabrication. [Text] [Hanoi VNA in English 1503 GMT 3 Dec 86 OW] /9738

VIETNAM-SOVIET EMULATION DRIVE--The current SRV-USSR friendship and emulation drive has yielded fine results in more than 100 Soviet equipment enterprises and construction sites. The drive was launched early this year with the aim of speeding up the construction tempo of key projects and completing several projects. Fifteen projects, including two tunnels at the construction site of the Hoa Binh hydroelectric power plant, have been completed. Meanwhile, workers of the Tri An hydroelectric power plant in South Vietnam have completed 80 percent of the preparatory work for the damming of Dong Nai River early next year. Meanwhile, the fourth generator of the Pha Lai thermoelectric power station has been put into commission. The SRV-USSR oil and gas joint venture in Vung Tau, South Vietnam has put oil rig No. 3 into operation 2 and ½ months ahead of schedule. [Text] [Hanoi International Service in English 1000 GMT 4 Dec 86 BK] /9738

CSO: 4200/189

HAIPHONG PARTY REPORT REVIEWS ACHIEVEMENTS, SETS TASK, GOALS

Hanoi NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 1 Sep 86 pp 3, 4

[Excerpts from draft political report: "Situation and Task of Haiphong Municipal Party Organization"]

[Text] Editor's note: NHAN DAN hereunder offers its readers passages on evaluation of the socioeconomic situation and task, and on party building, excerpted from the draft political report of the Haiphong Municipal CPV Committee to be presented at the Ninth Municipal Party Organization Congress.

Achievements, Shortcomings, Experience

The term of the Municipal Party Organization Congress, Eighth Term, was a period full of enthusiastic spirit on the part of the party organization. The army and people of Haiphong Municipality struggled hard with great efforts, overcame many extreme challenges and difficulties, and scored great achievements, thus changing the face of the municipality.

1. Achievements: The four norms set for grain production, industry, capital construction, and export-import were overfulfilled in terms of the requirements mentioned in the congress resolution; other norms were adjusted on a yearly basis to suit the realities and, following such adjustments, were either fulfilled or overfulfilled, certainly greatly overfulfilled in comparison with the 1980 figures.

In agriculture, the fact that rice crop yield increased from 4 to 7 tons per hectare, the total grain production was 325,000 tons, and more than 300,000 hogs were raised was an overwhelming success; farmers in general had enough to eat and still were able to fulfill their obligation to the state, with the ability to satisfy the grain needs among nonproducers being increased. Production of vegetables and sea products is having the tendency to develop. Export of agricultural and sea products, particularly shrimp, now accounts for 30 percent of total export income.

In industry, small industry, and handicrafts, the value of gross production increased by 20 percent over 1978. Goods for domestic consumption and export

in these sectors accounted for a greater share, 58 percent. Communications were expanded; the transporting capacity was increased to satisfy the growing needs of transportation. The group of central installations covering various economic sectors also reached a higher level of efficiency. The port underwent good changes. Progress was made in receiving and supplying electric power, with active and urgent efforts being made to improve and build the power network.

In capital construction, the fact that new fixed assets were increasing at an average annual rate of 61.7 percent and that hundreds of big, medium, and small projects, such as piers, bridges and roads, canals and ditches, sluices, dams, public services, electric power and water supply, post offices, environmental protection, housing, sewers, and so on, have been or are being put into operation has been an outstanding achievement in our efforts to attain the goal of building the material and technical base of socialism.

Export-import provided the initial capital for construction of the municipality. Total income in foreign currencies in 1985 was much greater than that in 1980.

As the result of active work and their efforts to consolidate and further develop the effectiveness of the achievements made in the four above-mentioned fields, the planning, materials, banking, financial, grain, and domestic trade (state-operated commerce and marketing cooperatives) sectors and the organs in charge of market management succeeded through relatively good coordination in both effectively operating and reorganizing while gradually building the new mechanism, thus creating the combined strength of the economy. Financial and monetary activities ensured increasing income and basically satisfied the growing spending needs. The common efforts of both production and circulation-distribution to improve economic management, to achieve the one-price mechanism for commercial enterprise, to make arrangements for small business people, to destroy nests of speculation and smuggling, and so on brought the municipality's market through gradual changes in the direction of achieving stability for itself.

Efforts were made to maintain, in some aspects to develop and to gradually improve quality, cultural and artistic, educational, public health, scientific and technological, mass communication and propaganda, physical education and sports, and other activities in order to satisfy more and more effectively the requirements of economic development and at the same time to take care of the cultural and spiritual living standard.

About the actual living conditions of the people in a situation full of difficulties, the municipality's party organization and administration in the past years were seeking every possible means to provide them with the least necessities, to get jobs for working people, to implement the army rear-area policy in favor of retired and disabled people, to support the lonely or disabled elderly people, and to gradually wipe out social ills. The living standard of the great majority of farmers was improved in terms of both food and housing; 80 percent of houses in the countryside now had tiled roofs. About living conditions in cities, efforts were made to lessen some difficulties by improving the environment; stabilizing the supply of nine

fixed-quantity goods, particularly grain; granting price subsidies to wages; and for the first time paying more attention to teachers, physicians, writers, artists, and so on.

Realizing that Haiphong occupies a key economic and national-defense position, the party organization, army, and people of the municipality, with sustained revolutionary vigilance, have been closely linking the implementation of economic and social policies with national defense and security and creating favorable material and spiritual conditions for ensuring victory in the fight against the enemy's multifaceted war of destruction. The "Develop the good nature and raise the fighting power of the people's armed forces" and "Get rich and fight to win" campaigns were actively and effectively conducted. The armed units of the municipality and the arms and armed services stationed in the municipality strongly developed their hard-core role and scored many achievements in consolidating, building, and perfecting the defense lines in coastal areas and offshore islands; in recruiting; in military training and maneuvers; in sending aid to the border-area front; and in taking part in construction of the municipality's large-project clusters. The security forces, while carrying out the movement to learn from and to act in accordance with Uncle Ho's six teachings, gradually made themselves clean and strong, developed their hard-core and assault role on the national security front, and maintained better social order and security.

The above-mentioned achievements were not separated from the changes and progress made in the activities of the party, administration, and mass organizations as one system. In party building, 500 party organizations and chapters were awarded commendations or banners, and 4 districts were recommended as recipients of the "Strong party organization" banner; more than 5,000 new party members were admitted, while more than 1,000 persons who no longer qualified as members were expelled from the party. The ideological and cadres-organizing work succeeded in staying close to and serving better the political task; linking ideological matters with action, and to an increasing extent with economic matters; and more boldly renewing arrangement and organization in connection with implementation of the policy having to do with cadres. The task of compiling the history of the party organization and municipality made active contributions to further developing the revolutionary tradition and stepping up fulfillment of the immediate and long-term political task. Party control work was linked with fulfilling the socioeconomic task and educating people to prevent violating discipline "from afar." The Fatherland Front and trade union, youth, women's, and collective farmers' organizations gradually changed their operating methods, moved to the basic level, adopted additional forms of action aimed at jointly educating the masses, developed the role of taking part in socioeconomic management, and organized mass emulation movements to promote revolutionary action. Administrations at all levels were consolidated in conjunction with gradually renewing the socioeconomic management mechanism; further developed the role of people's councils; continued to build and strengthen the district and ward level; and carried out more and more effectively the decentralizing process aimed at giving self-control to the district, ward, and basic levels.

2. Shortcomings: The potential capabilities of land, rivers, the sea, the port and labor, occupations, science and technology, and so on were not yet

exploited as much as we could.

Agricultural production was far from total; in fisheries, we have so far paid attention only to catching and not enough to raising various kinds of sea products, particularly shrimp.

Industry, small industry, and handicrafts were not able to serve the municipality's consumption needs, agricultural production, and export because their products were not abundant enough and there were not enough varieties to satisfy their needs. The quality of some consumer goods was improved, but generally speaking it was still poor. The production of building materials showed slow expansion.

In capital construction, although investment was concentrated on the key projects, it remained rather scattered. Beside the projects that showed high quality, beautiful designs, and fast construction, there were some projects that were plagued by delayed work, poor quality, failure to stick to blueprints, waste, and loss of materials.

In circulation and distribution, many negative aspects remained, particularly in commercial activities; there were quite a few phenomena, such as hampering, monopolizing, authoritarian behavior, state subsidies, and passivity in business activities and in serving production and business, and in market management excessive banning, while unwholesome practices in all state-operated, collective, and private sectors were not resolved in time and firmly dealt with. The network of service organizations for various activities in society was not expanded in an appropriate manner, with quality remaining poor. The food and beverage service, however, was too abundant and expensive.

In the cultural and social field, there were many efforts, but in some aspects the rate of development and quality improvement remained slow. In the socioeconomic life many signs of negative and unlawful behavior still showed complex changes. Compliance with the law and the Constitution was far from absolute. Disorder existed in communications, sanitation, and management of public works. Social ills, mostly superstition, funeral rites, wedding practices, and so on, were still very serious.

The standard of living, particularly that of cadres, workers, and civil servants, still faced many difficulties; the adverse effects of the policy having to do with prices-wages-money were not yet overcome, with much confusion, passivity, and wrong prices remaining, and the market lacking stability.

3. Reasons: There were objective reasons behind the above-mentioned strengths and weaknesses, but eventually the municipality's party organization, CPV Committee, and Standing Committee of the CPV Committee would have to be responsible for them.

The Municipal CPV Committee and its Standing Committee showed their unity and solidarity, always displayed their offensive revolutionary spirit, stressed responsibility, acted on their own initiative and with dynamic quality in leadership and guidance matters, maintained the revolutionary morality, and succeeded in motivating the party organization, army, and people of the

municipality for overcoming difficulties and moving the municipality forward. However, the basic weakness was the fact that the concept and application of our country's characteristic objective economic laws in the first stage of the transitional period to the locality remained poor and lacked unanimity and uniformity. In leadership rightist tendencies sometimes existed in the face of a number of negative aspects in the socioeconomic life.

The fact that some responsible members of the party organization had failed to strive to improve and train themselves in terms of work capacity and behavior, to be close to the basic level, to be truly democratic, and to readily adopt new things had adverse effects on the collectives' normal activities. At any level and in any sector there were people who, because of unchanged theoretical and economic thinking, failed to develop dynamic and creative qualities, to change the ways of leadership and organization to make them suit the realities better, nor to continue thinking about and doing new things to make their leadership more effective.

Some matters that had not been studied deeply enough nor given close leadership while being carried out included perfecting and carrying out better the mechanism for product contracting; building early models of cooperatives or unions of agriculture-industry-commerce-credit cooperatives; failing to adopt a real formula for a one-price commercial enterprise mechanism; and lacking appropriate leadership in industry, small industry, and handicrafts and for development of the family-based economy and cultural, educational, and social activities.

Although the party's ideological, organizational, and control organs and the state's internal affairs and inspection organs scored many achievements, they failed to keep up with the new situation and task, to renew the management mechanism, and to make more active contributions to upholding social law; showed a lack of depth and sensitivity in resolving new problems; did not fight firmly enough against acts of ideological sabotage; were slow in promoting party members' growth; did not do a good job in terms of training party members and raising their quality; and did not keep the forces of reserve and succeeding cadres ready for action. As the new positions of organization and new policies were being implemented, there still were obstacles, particularly when it involved the "rights" and "benefits" of individuals.

Beside a great majority of cadres and party members having matured and brilliantly fulfilled the assigned task, quite a few of them showed declining revolutionary will, pursued selfish interests, failed to fulfill their task, and even became decadent and deviant, which was detrimental to the prestige of the party and state.

4. Experience: From the achievements and shortcomings some lessons were drawn:

First, always display the offensive revolutionary spirit, raise awareness, combine theory with practice, and seriously and correctly carry out the party views and line, first of all the economic line.

The socioeconomic model and space-use plan of the municipality were determined along with the direction, contents, and steps to be taken until 2005, which were reflected in a series of economic, social, security, and national defense positions in a package of 48 resolutions of the Municipal CPV Committee and its Standing Committee. Many districts and wards were able to draft overall socioeconomic plans.

In the execution of plans, it was obvious that the role of the port was gradually confirmed as a precondition for its expansion and for more construction to make it larger; the three sectors of agriculture, industry, and export-import were closely bound into an economic structure to encourage one another to develop and to serve and carry out the municipality's socioeconomic strategy.

Agriculture was determined as holding the key position and received concentrated leadership and investment for building its material and technical base, with improvement of management being closely linked with "sweetening" the soil and adopting other technical intensive-cultivation measures, opening new land extended into the sea, putting tiles on roofs, and building the new countryside. Because there had been a switch to more active leadership in industry which had been showing efforts to move forward, since 1983 remarkable changes have been made in this sector to restore production early and to create favorable conditions for further progress. Export-import business showed more and more clearly its strategic significance, obtained good economic results, encouraged production development, strengthened the material and technical base, and contributed to stabilizing the standard of living.

In addition to providing capital we acquired additional experience in using capital: adopted correct investment direction and policy, calling for linking production with the standard of living and between immediate and long-term matters; in capital construction, invested in agriculture on a first-priority basis, with importance being attached to the infrastructural installations ranging from large-scale projects in communications, electric power production, and so on to small-scale social welfare projects in districts, wards, subwards, villages; and paid appropriate attention to investing in export-import and sea transportation. But for industry, small industry, and handicrafts investment was lagging behind their actual capabilities.

Second, always maintain and strengthen unity and solidarity, and further develop the collective-ownership power of the masses.

With the formula calling for "fight for changes, solidarity, effectiveness, and achieve a higher degree of solidarity and thus greater effectiveness," linking fulfillment of the socioeconomic task with the mechanism of "the party leads, the people are masters, the state manages," and with the motto, "the people know, discuss, do things, and control," the party organization, army, and people of the municipality were achieving greater and greater ideological unity and unity of action, and developing the combined power of the entire system of proletarian dictatorship aimed at the common goal of building and defending the municipality.

The resolutions of the Municipal CPV Committee called for close relationships between economic and social policies, starting with the party having confidence in the people and wholeheartedly serving them. Because many policies did actively affect production and the people's life to the extent of the degree of their implementation, they helped to consolidate and further strengthen the relationships between the party and the masses and between the masses and the administration, further consolidated the masses' confidence in the party, and encouraged the masses to take revolutionary action.

Another aspect of the lesson on maintaining and strengthening unity and solidarity within the party was to train cadres and party members in acquiring revolutionary quality, striving to renew the ways of thinking and doing things, daring to do and to bear responsibility, doing their best for the sake of common interests, building up self-confidence, refusing to be discouraged and to lose patience, and having no fear for the enemy or anybody else, including bad elements, conservative people, those who would not understand them, and jealous people.

However, attention should be paid to the following points: The relationships between economic and social policies in regard to educating and training the young generation were not very good yet; not enough attention was paid to the relationships between the law and the socioeconomic policies; proper importance was not yet attached to improving, caring for, and exploiting the "gray matter" of science-technology cadres and skilled workers.

Third, develop the dynamic quality in renewing leadership style and raise the ability and effectiveness of leadership in organizing implementation.

The party organization always refused to give up in the face of difficulties, always moved forward, always thought things over and looked for new ways and new ways to do things, applied and carried out the principle of democratic centralism, firmly fought against bureaucratic centralism and state subsidies, and totally switched to economic accounting and socialist business.

We did not solely adopt product contracting, but also followed it up by pointing to new problems and gradually moving agriculture toward socialist large-scale production; along with agricultural production and with building the new countryside, adopted the policy of building and strengthening the subward level and linking urban management with gradually paying more attention to leadership over industry, commerce, industry, and handicrafts, and along with continuing partial and total decentralization in favor of districts and wards, actively built the new management mechanism and thus created the right of self-support in production and business for basic-level economic units. In circulation and distribution, we stepped up business activities in the domestic trade, foreign trade, services, and financial and monetary sectors and granted price subsidies to wages, as well as adopted the free-price commercial business system. In the transportation sector, building the new transport line was a strategically major thing, carried out with high speed. The construction of living quarters and of the social, cultural, and health

On the other hand, we strengthened the leadership, arranged the movement of cadres in a manner suitable to the need for renewal and the strengthening of the

socioeconomic management so as to make the machinery more effective and to raise the labor productivity of cadres, gradually changed work behavior, handled the daily work in accordance with the accepted mechanism and program, strengthened control over implementation, and regularly held preliminary and final reviews.

Developing Socioeconomic Activities

With such achievements and experience in the past term, we are perfecting and continuing to determine the socioeconomic model of Haiphong in the coming years, and quickly striving to become "The municipality (that) has a modern port and developed industry, agriculture, and services, one of the export-import centers and a steel fortress in the fight against aggression." At the same time, move one step toward building the Cat Hai sea products center in Co Son and create favorable conditions for turning the marine economy soon into one of the key economic sectors; build, protect, and develop the uses of the Cat Hai National Garden.

The general direction to be taken in the next term will be to strive to exploit the existing potential capabilities; to quickly and vigorously develop industry, agriculture, fisheries, and services and to combine them closely with export; to link production with circulation and the economy with culture, social affairs, security, and national defense; to maintain a balanced budget; to have accumulation in the national economy, starting with production in industry, agriculture, and fishery, and export-import; and along with an effective use of capital borrowed from foreign countries, to create a favorable situation that will allow stabilizing and developing the municipality's economy in the early 1990's.

1. Task and Major Goals

- Vigorously develop agricultural production; make arrangement for, stabilize, and develop industrial production; expand service activities; ensure a fast increase of the volume of goods; gradually satisfy the municipality's growing needs; and step up export-import while associating with friendly localities. Ensure a stable average rice crop yield of 8 tons/hectare or more, and 400,000 hogs. Double the value of gross industrial output; increase by 70-75 percent the volume of export and consumer goods. Improve the electric power network in urban areas, district capitals, and towns for the purpose of maintaining stable power supply for production and the people's daily activities.

Double the foreign-currency income from export, while developing the supporting effects of foreign trade on domestic trade; continue to make arrangement in favor of small business people, to improve market management, and to stabilize prices.

- Direct all efforts toward stabilizing and further improving the material and cultural living standard, particularly in connection with food and housing; electric power and water supply, transportation, treatment of diseases, and education.

Strive to have jobs for all people of labor age; achieve compulsory education at the general middle school level among people of 18-25 years of age and key cadres.

Reestablish order and restore social rule; strengthen the law; build the new socialist man, and link it with building a civilized and courteous way of living; and get rid of six social ills.

- Continue to build the material and technical base of socialism; make priority investment aimed at showing obvious effectiveness in favor of production in agriculture, fisheries, industry, services, and export; attach importance to investment in electric power and communications and raise the capacity of transportation; and pay more attention to sociocultural matters, with the focal point being housing, schools, and public health, as well as planning for urban beautification in old cities, construction of new cities, and expansion of coastal areas. Perfect the Do Son-Cat Hai tourist system. Basically complete the plan calling for putting tiles on all roofs.

Strengthen and consolidate the socialist production relationships; develop the leading role of the state-operated economic component, and along with the transforming task, boldly use other economic components. Perfect and accelerate the use of the new economic management mechanism, and ensure the right of basic-level economic units to take initiative in production and business.

- Keep political security in a firm shape, with good changes in social order and security. With national defense being strong enough, maintain combat readiness under any circumstances.

- Keep unity and solidarity in the party organization and keep party, administration, and mass organizations firm and strong; let cadres grow in a manner suitable for the political task and renewal of the socioeconomic management mechanism.

- Keep the revolutionary mass movement grow in a steady manner; firmly move into the three revolutions; concentrate efforts on renewing the socioeconomic management mechanism; raise productivity, quality, savings, and efficiency.

2. Economic Guidelines, Policies

- a. With agriculture remaining the forefront, concentrate efforts on total agricultural development; quickly raise the volume of agricultural, sea, and animal products to satisfy the basic consumption needs and to increase the supply of goods for export and raw materials for small industry and handicrafts; perfect the agricultural management mechanism and correctly implement the economic-lever policies; link industry, commerce, and credit with agriculture; concentrate efforts first on soil improvement, partial mechanization, and resolution of the water supply problem; fight harmful insects and diseases; have enough fertilizer and keep some reserve of it.

Quickly increase the number of hogs, particularly sows, and make sure to get them weigh in average 70 kilograms or more at the time they go to market.

Stabilize the areas devoted to growing vegetables, particularly the specialized-cultivation vegetables, in order to satisfy consumption and export needs. Systematically extend the areas devoted to growing industrial crops, particularly rush, peanut, and sugar cane.

Vigorously develop the small industrial and handicraft occupations in agriculture, properly use surplus labor, and gradually achieve new division of labor.

In fisheries, attach importance to both raising and catching, particularly shrimp. Gradually use the income from export to buy equipment to strengthen the material and technical base of fisheries, move toward more offshore catching, quickly develop additional occupations; at the same time fully use lakes, ponds, and streams to raise fish and shrimp and to increase volume of production; satisfy the municipality's need for fish; and raise the quality of sea products for export.

b. Further increase investment, leadership, and capital in industry and create favorable conditions for strong industrial development.

In the years to come stabilize production, first of all production in the machine industry; develop a number of consumer goods and export industries, particularly the ones having to do with processing of agricultural, sea, and animal products and manufacturing of building materials (especially bricks, stone, and lime) and necessary chemicals like carbonate of soda, sodium hydroxide, etc.

While there still are difficulties in many fields, combine in a harmonious manner multifaceted development with specialization, medium scale with small scale, and industry with handicrafts; develop the leading role of the state-operated sector while vigorously exploiting and developing other economic components (collective, individual, and family-based components of small industry and handicrafts). Try to use the full capacity of the existing machinery and equipment and at the same time put aside a fixed amount of capital to buy additional modern small equipment, exploit all natural conditions and existing labor, as well as fully use other factors to step up industrial production, particularly production of small industry and handicrafts. Take advantage of in-depth investment in order to synchronize various components up sections, or the entire assembly line, and to strongly expand production of traditional industrial items that hold great potential; raise the quality and quantities of major, unique products that are in a position of strength; quickly increase the volume of consumer goods for export; and gradually carry out correctly the plan for industrial development in the planned allocation of industry-agriculture-services.

In order to ensure enough supply of materials, in addition to the goods being manufactured on contract for the central administration and foreign countries, maintain association with the friendly localities and export in order to import the necessary raw materials, machinery, and equipment. Every production unit must draft its own plan for providing itself with raw

materials, including domestic materials and materials to be imported from foreign countries.

In addition to renewing the management mechanism quickly apply scientific and technological progress to production in order to raise productivity, quality, and production efficiency.

c. Expand at a strong pace service activities in order to quickly turn them into an important economic sector consisting of production services and services having to do with life such as communications service; services at the port, for ships, and for scrapping and dismantling old boats; fishery service; scientific and technological services; tourist, food and beverage, sociocultural services, and so on.

The municipality is both rebuilding and transforming the old city and shaping the new city by extending it into the sea; has been creating clusters of economic-commercial-cultural-tourist centers in different areas; and is turning Haiphong into an export-tourist-services center.

d. Continue to step up capital construction and to transform, perfect, and build anew the material and technical base of socialism. Attach importance to the in-depth investment formula and carry out construction projects that bring about quick results and in which the state, people, and all levels work together. Concentrate efforts on improving and building the electric power network; complete construction of the Dinh Vu-Cat Ba trans-island railway. Draft the economic and technical arguments for the Hong and Hong River bridge and ferryboat projects and start their actual construction; propose that the central administration build anew the Cement Plant, Binh Hai, and Quy Co bridges. Build the Thuy Giang network of dike, roads, dams, and sluices. Complete construction of the beltway; improve and upgrade a number of urban roads, Route 5, and Route 10; get additional means of sea and coastal transportation and partially renew the means of transportation of passengers. Build the Vat Cach water supply and a number of its distribution stations; improve the network of water pipelines. Remodel the old hotels and at the same time accelerate and start construction of a number of new ones. Complete construction of the Vietnam-Czechoslovakia Cultural House, the expanded television station, and Kien An and Hung Hoa movie houses; start construction of the party's headquarters and the general hospital; accelerate the housing and school construction projects while completing the smaller projects in urban areas.

e. As the overall economic situation in the country still faces many difficulties, to get capital investment for socio-economic and cultural construction and development remains a very tough matter. Therefore, concentrate efforts on stepping up production, first of all in the economic sectors where quick results can be obtained, and at the same time always attach importance to developing foreign economic activities (particularly export-import) in order to get capital.

In the financial field, exploit and quickly increase its sources of income and focus on the municipality's budget to ensure the volume of spending plan spending on the basis of income in order to balance the budget. Adopt a

strict policy of saving money in connection with spending in the budget. Strengthen financial inspection.

Renew banking activities; properly do monetary-circulation work to serve production and everyday life. Stabilize all appropriate economic measures and policies in order to mobilize all sources of idle capital among the people. Satisfy in time the need for capital and cash in production and business. Strictly manage cash and reduce budgetary deficit.

Reorganize and expand socialist commerce; continue to coordinate synchronized activities of the food industry and commerce with those of the financial and banking sectors, taxes, prices, market management, and so on in order to control goods, money, and the socialist business, to link production with market, and both to stimulate production and to encourage consumption in order to promote increase of both. Continue to achieve the one-price business mechanism. Continue to make arrangement in favor of small business people; develop the leading role of socialist commerce in controlling the social market, which is made more abundant and richer in terms of having goods to satisfy society's needs; firmly fight speculation, smuggling, and counterfeiting; and stabilize prices.

3. Renewal of Economic Management

In the years to come the party organization will continue to promote taking initiative and acting dynamically in renewing the economic management mechanism and totally switching from bureaucratic centralism and state subsidies to economic accounting and socialist business.

Renewing the management mechanism must ensure compliance with the objective economic laws being first of all aimed at the following points:

Continue to perfect and achieve socioeconomic management decentralization in favor of districts and wards and to develop the right of basic-level economic units to have self-control in production and business. Mobilize and encourage localities and production and business units to be dynamic and to act creatively and effectively.

Improve the planning mechanism; ensure plans being linked with society's market in order to correctly reflect social needs; draft plans on the basis of economic contracts, with production being linked with consumption. Strengthen the extraction, management, storage, and use of materials, and writing off of assets. Properly carry out economic arbitration.

Correctly use such economic levers as prices, income, wages, credit, and so on in order to regulate production and business, to stimulate production and to expand circulation of goods, and to ensure both fulfilling the obligation of production and business installations and working people to the state and promoting the right to use the fruit of their labor on their own initiative. Decentralize the process of fixing and managing prices and promote the right of the basic level to draft price plans. Have specific plans for rationally using the remaining share of income of production installations. Strictly apply the piecework wages system and extend the various forms of contracting.

Build equal and fair credit relationships between production and business installations and the bank.

Rearrange and reorganize the production and business management machinery to make sure it is efficient and brings about good results; clearly determine the administrative and economic functions of the general and specialized machinery system and the economic and technical functions of the production and business enterprise system (independent stores and corporations), or unions of production and business enterprises.

Party Building

Build strong party organizations and party chapters on the basis of raising the strength of party members and the leading capacity of party committee echelons in the political task; know how to find "the weakest links" and the most decisive "buttons" in order to resolve difficulties and to truly become the nucleus, a strong, firm, and loyal collective, leading the way for the benefit of a unit, a locality, or a sector. The policies and positions of the party and state, the directives of superior echelons, and new problems arising from the realities must be discussed by the collectives in order to fully understand them and to carry them out. Making reckless statement beyond the capacity of the organization and talking and acting contrarily to the spirit and contents of party resolutions is prohibited. Maintain on a regular basis the system of party activities and make periodical self-criticisms and criticisms. Condemn and firmly eliminate all manifestations of dealing with, unfairly rejecting, and suppressing differing opinions in debates and dynamic and creative ways of doing things in connection with organizing the implementation of decisions. Actively develop the inspection and control role of all party organizations and ensure the true and indivisible quality of the latter in terms of awareness and action.

Attach importance to perfecting, building, and organizing both the administration and mass organizations to make them strong and capable of fulfilling their functions and task in the system of proletarian dictatorship in accordance with the mechanism of "The party leads, the state manages, the people are masters." It is necessary to truly develop democracy in all activities of the people's councils, where the people's will, aspirations, and power are expressed in regard to the major decisions having to do with the economic and political life of the people, to fully develop the task of the administration at all levels toward institutionalizing from the state's standpoint all the party organization's directives and resolutions, and to lead the efforts to organize strict and effective implementation of such directives and resolutions.

Respect and actively develop the role of mass organizations to control and supervise the activities of cadres, party members, party organizations, and the administration so as to ensure the collective ownership right of working people. All voices and ideas contributed by members of the people's councils and executive committees of mass organizations must be appreciated, considered, studied, and thoroughly resolved as an effort to make them a feature of the accommodate-the-people system.

Take better care of the training, elementary and advanced, of party members and cadres, both within and outside of the party, so as to make all of them gradually raise their theoretical, cultural, managerial, scientific and technological, and revolutionary-morality capabilities not only through courses but also by getting hardened in the process of applying and implementing the party's line and policies, which have been tested by realities. The realities are not limited by experiences in the stage of national democratic revolution, nor in the period of administrative bureaucratic management and state subsidies, but rather by experiences in the new period, in which there are major changes in our activities aimed at renewing our ideological thinking, economic management, and leadership behavior. The educational and training programs and curricula, both long- and short-term, in the centralized schools and classes or on the job must be able to reflect the above-mentioned needs along with teaching and training in the party's revolutionary traditions.

The loyal, righteous, economy-minded, industrious, honest, and just cadres and party members who work extremely hard, with self-control and dynamic and creative qualities; dare to think, to do, to fight, and to bear responsibility; and have the ability to persuade other persons to do work together and to obtain good results from their work are brilliant examples that must be strongly encouraged and mobilized. At the same time, do not be rightist for any moment and do not neglect the fight against conservative manifestations; the old knowledges and work habits; a failure to steadily uphold the party's views, line, directives, and resolutions and the Municipal CPV Committee's resolutions and directives; and the tendencies to be cut off from realities, to do business with poor results and in an arbitrary, autocratic, and patriarchic manner, to show a declining will to fight, to seek a peaceful, selfish, and parasitic way of living, and to become decadent, backward, and deviant.

Among other standards and conditions, the good and bad manifestations mentioned above serve as a yardstick to measure the revolutionary qualities of cadres and party members and a means to enlarge party membership by recruiting new members; to expel from the party and state organs those persons who are no longer qualified as members and the "parasites" who are no longer qualified as state cadres and civil servants; to maintain the management and control of cadres; and to draft and carry out plans calling for selecting and recommending cadres for promotion and turning to "younger" people for recruitment. Among party members and cadres there must be more workers, socialist intellectuals, women, and young people. As we make the ranks of cadres "younger," we must always ensure succession and continuity for generations of cadres; combine young, middle-aged, and old cadres; achieve mobilization and rotation of cadres among different echelons; and make arrangement to ensure "The right work and people means high labor efficiency." Study and apply rational systems of allowances and treatment in regard to those cadres who have made considerable contributions to the revolution and now are about to retire, and encourage the talented and creative collectives and individuals to bring about greater results.

Training aimed at raising the quality of cadres and party members must be closely linked with plans for cadres, management of cadres and party members, and protection of the party; management here involves not only their identities but also full and accurate background information about all of their activities, with management including work both in their production units and in society and within their families.

Party control work must always be renewed to satisfy the need to fulfill the political task, to improve economic management, and to strengthen social management. Continue to carry out the system of controlled leadership, and closely combine party control work with state and people's inspection work. Continue to carry out the view on education calling for "prevention" and "early avoidance of violations" and the formula requiring taking just, accurate, and timely action in handling disciplinary cases. Develop new dynamic, creative, and effective factors and at the same time properly deal with serious mistakes.

Leadership behavior must also be renewed. This behavior involves correctly carrying out the principle of democratic centralism; truly extending democratic practices, collective leadership, and individual assignment; working with a high sense of responsibility, enthusiasm, and urgency, with disciplined activities being combined with vigorously developing self-control, dynamic and creative work, keeping in close touch with realities, and being sensitive to new things; reinforcing and multiplying new positive factors; and daringly and firmly fighting to get rid of the old behavior and old way of doing things, which was spontaneous, conservative, slow, and plagued by inaction and indecision. This is the behavior of "while talking and listening, do work and also walk," meaning always moving forward, never feeling complacent, and being unafraid of difficulties. This is the way of doing work with a definite program, in a systematic manner, with accurate and true information, and with a plan for scientific achievement; it involves regular control, preliminary and final reviews, and leadership over organizing implementation of resolutions, which are constantly supplemented, perfected, and made to become always lively, rich, close to realities, and suitable for the people's will, and to bring about realistic results.

5598

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MORE POLITICAL, IDEOLOGICAL EDUCATION FOR PARTY MEMBERS SUGGESTED

Hanoi NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 3 Oct 86 p 3

[Letter by Lai The Kiem of Bim Son Town, Thanh Hoa: "Strengthening Political and Ideological Education for Party Members"]

[Text] The leadership quality and the prestige of the party lie in the party's correct policies and the efficiency of their implementation. However, another factor plays a very important role in ensuring that the policies are carried out well and that the prestige of the party is enhanced: the quality of cadres and party members in work and combat, in collective life, and in private life. To my knowledge, that quality and morality can be understood as this: to be a Communist Party member, one has to struggle tirelessly and to make sacrifices all his life for the communist ideology and for the people's happiness. Yet it is not enough, because the party member has to live a honest and healthy life, to be the symbol of the new socialist man, and, in his words and his deeds, to be an exemplary model for the masses to follow.

The socialist revolution is a most intense struggle from which capitalism or socialism will come out as a winner. For socialism, its fundamental philosophy is to eliminate the class of exploiters and its vestiges, to place production materials under public ownership, to distribute them in conformity with labor, and to improve the spiritual and material lives of the working people.

Moreover, at present, because of the lingering difficulties the country is still confrontive and of other various reasons, production development is slow, the national economy suffers serious imbalances, and topping all that, we have to fight harsh natural calamities and protect the fatherland. All those problems were the causes for negative phenomena in almost all the domains of our economic and social life, adversely affecting the ranks of our party members.

At present, besides the large majority of cadres and party members who legitimately enjoy their reputation as faithful members devoted to the party, possessing the spirit of sacrifice, living a simple and healthy life, and maintaining an unquestioned, crystal-clear relationship with the masses, there is a pretty large number of other cadres with wrongful perceptions who frequently err in their words and deeds and jeopardize the party's prestige

among the people. The latter groups may be broken down into the following types:

1. Some party members, when given a certain level of authority, failed to meet the permanent requirement for self-improvement in thoughts and moral quality and became degenerated or depraved. Their most serious mistakes were disputing special favors and interests, stealing, bribery, smuggling, etc. This type of individual would not leave any stone unturned to earn a better living in the lowest materialistic style. Whenever their schemes were uncovered, they ganged up with others, flattered their superiors to seek protection, abused their subordinates, and tried to black out information to conceal their crimes.
2. Some others lost their sense of direction or were wishy-washy in their thoughts, were unable to distinguish right from wrong, used to make senseless statements, spread rumors, and made overstatements about negative phenomena. Were they gravely affected by opportunism?
3. Some party members were no better than the common people in terms of quality and capabilities.

I would like to make the following recommendations:

1. When propaganda activities are conducted to invite more enrollment into the party, proper attention must be given to determining the prospective candidate's motivation. After acceptance, the new party members must continue to learn about Marxism-Leninism and about the history of the party's revolutionary struggle.
2. For all party members in general, systematic training must be given to cover party policies and actualities in order to inculcate the ability to understand and carry out political tasks. Appropriate attention will be focused on teaching Marxism-Leninism in basic and intermediate programs so that the party members possess a correct philosophy of life and world conception, and through this knowledge, reaffirm their viewpoints, improve their revolutionary knowledge, develop new thoughts in work, and rapidly gain a good grasp of party policies and lines.

Training must be institutionalized and compulsory for party members. They must see it as their duty and as their privilege as well. While in training, the party members must be evaluated to see how much he has learned, and disciplinary measures must be taken against indolent members who neglect their political education.

3. While political education is conducted, the party members must be closely monitored in terms of thoughts, work, and activities. At present, this type of supervision is quite loose, causing aloofness of party committees vis-a-vis party members and lack of interaction between party members. In other words, party members in a same unit do not know what the

other fellow is thinking and how this thinking evolves, and hence, they cannot support each other to progress together.

4. Self-criticism and criticism must be made a permanent, periodic, and standard mode of internal activities. Meanwhile, disciplinary actions must be taken against party members who commit grave mistakes.

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STRICT CONTROL OF VCR'S, TAPES URGED

Hanoi NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 12 Sep 86 p 2

[Article by Nguyen Thu, head of the Movie Department: "Manage the Use of VCR's and Tapes"]

[Text] The use of video cassette recorders and tapes, spurred on by spontaneous growth, is now at sixes and sevens in many localities. Viewer mail, local media reports, and a social investigation by the Vietnam Film Export, Import, and Distribution Corp. indicate that, in recent days, for-profit video showing by groups and individuals in various localities have generated serious damage.

According to incomplete statistics, there are 3,000 VCR's nationwide, topped by Ho Chi Minh City with 2,000 machines. Quang Ninh has 90 machines. At the bottom of the ladder is Gia Lai-Kontum-Dac Lac with 10 VCR's.

Of thousands of videotapes and programs presently in circulation and use, one half comes from capitalist countries with odd and provocative titles and noxious contents.

To cope with that situation, on 20 October 1985, the chairman of the Council of Ministers issued Directive No 139/CT, directing the Ministry of Culture to manage and regulate the use of VCR's and tapes. On 14 April 1986, the Ministry of Culture issued a circular to guide implementation of the above directive, making the Movie Department the sole organ to guide and manage activities relating to the production, dissemination, exportation, and importation of VCR's and tapes nationwide (not including the Vietnam Committee on Broadcasting and Television network).

Since the Council of Minister's directive and the Ministry of Culture's circular were issued, some localities have taken positive remedial steps while others have fallen down on the job. The chaotic use of VCR's and tapes persisted, violating state laws and causing damage to the cultural, ideological, and social fields.

Recently, the Ministry of Culture sent an official letter to the people's committee chairmen in the provinces, cities, and special zones, urging them to address the situation.

To put an end to disorderly video showings in the localities is a difficult and complex task. They provide cultural entertainment and also a comfortable source of income which collectives and individuals are not eager to give up. Experiences from many localities indicate that stability was promptly restored where provincial CPV and people's committees mindfully and resolutely sent written orders spelling out positions and directives to sectors and echelons. In these places, the use of VCR's and tapes was gradually put under control. By contrast, difficulties and obstacles arose in places where assiduous guidance and tangible instructions were lacking. Therefore, the first thing for the cultural services (including movie corporations) to do is to get these necessary written guidelines as soon as possible from their provincial CPV and people's committees.

The Movie Department, as a state agency in charge of VCR and tape management, has sent official letters to cultural and information services (the Provincial Movie Corp.), urging prompt implementation of Directive No 339/CT of the Council of Ministers and Circular No 89/VH of the Ministry of Culture; however, to ensure harmony and success, coordination between concerned organs--public security, finance, customs, propaganda and training, trade unions, and culture and information--is also needed.

Local control of VCR's and tapes should be entrusted to the Provincial Movie Corp. In terms of professionalism, network facilities, and managerial structure, it is best fit for the job. For the same reason, at the central echelon the Movie Department is called upon by the Council of Ministers and Ministry of Culture to perform that task; in fact, at the local level, it is assigned to public security, or the cultural and information service, or the broadcasting and television station. The lack of a single specialized body has led not only to new cumbersome organizations but also to loopholes through which negative phenomena emerged and developed.

To stabilize the situation promptly, the localities should resolutely prohibit all organs, units, and individuals not concerned with the video business from undertaking it for commercial purposes--selling tickets, signing contracts, and sending out to-be-paid-later invitations.

They should strictly ban showings of videotapes produced by capitalist countries with harmful political and ideological contents and in bad taste, and the dissemination--whether overt or clandestine--of imported and domestic videocassettes that contain recordings of foreign and Vietnamese films not cleared for local screenings.

These measures stem from a need to prevent political and ideological pollution and to ensure a state monopoly over the movie business according to regulations of the Ministry of Culture on film distribution in the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, thus helping with financial management and economic accounting to the benefit of the national budget.

Movie corporations in the provinces, cities, and special zones should be directed to register VCR's and tapes and issue permits for local use. The Movie Department has sent registration and permit forms to the localities.

The Ministry of Culture should set up a council to censor imported videotapes. All video programs should be cleared by the council for distribution and use.

The council should send a list of approved films to the localities to guide users.

The localities should stop right away the production of master tapes and the illegal purchase, sale, lease, and exchange of videotapes, in keeping with Article I, Part IV, of Circular No 89/VH of the Ministry of Culture, and should make a list of local installations engaged in the video business and submit it to the Movie Department to help the latter take managerial steps and issue permits.

The movie sector has made plans for setting up installations to service VCR's, produce and supply blank tapes and video titles, record new programs, and copy old ones, including movies--an undertaking which some localities have engaged in illegally, contrary to regulations on copyrights and on film distribution as stated above.

Nevertheless, due to limitations on capital and material and technical bases, we will continue to have trouble rising up to the occasion.

The movie sector should put up a video showing network to serve propaganda and indoctrination, disseminate scientific and technical information, and care for the people's need for wholesome entertainment. It should set standard ticket prices and strict regulations on organizing and operating the state-run video network nationwide.

To stimulate the expansion of mass information facilities, Directive No 339/CT of the Council of Ministers has authorized organs and individuals (aliens, overseas compatriots, and Vietnamese citizens) to import and export VCR's and tapes on the condition that they comply with regulations of the Ministry of Culture and customs.

VCR's and tapes are a modern electronic means of information which can serve propaganda, indoctrination, and television and provide the people with scientific and technical knowledge and entertainments. But for a rather long time, we have relaxed control, letting the video business have its own way, thus causing critical damage to society.

To meet the demand for ideological indoctrination, improve viewer esthetics, and unify the guidance of state-related cultural and information activities, we should promptly stabilize the situation through urgent and strict measures to regulate the use of VCR's and tapes. Only by doing this can we bring about efficiency as we have expected.

LAND RECLAMATION, WINTER CROP PREDICTIONS REPORTED

Hanoi NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 3 Oct 86 p 1

[Article: "On the Front of Grain Production: Hanoi Transferred People To Reclaim Uncultivated Suburban Land; Established Six New Economic-population Centers, Brought into Production 625 Hectares of New Land; Thuong Tin District: Winter Crop Area Doubled"]

[Text] The uncultivated land area belonging to the suburban districts of Hanoi measures over 36,000 hectares, including 10,000 hectares capable of being used for agricultural production, and the remainder is for afforestation.

To reduce the uncultivated land area gradually and provide employment for the workers, the municipal new economic zone bureau has worked in close cooperation with the agricultural, water conservancy, forestry, and land management sectors to build new economic centers. Up to now, Hanoi has transferred 891 families with a total of 3,653 persons including 1,863 laborers to establish the 6 new economic-population centers of Thuy An, Dong Trang, Dong Cham, Dong Do, Thuy Phuong, and Ha Lam.

At the above centers, the construction of housing quarters and public welfare facilities is in progress and the resettlers have quickly embarked in production activities. The uncultivated area reclaimed and brought to production has amounted so far to 625 hectares. Products harvested from the new lands consisted of 509 tons of paddy, 27 tons of cashews, 54 tons of sweet potatoes, 15 tons of corn, 4 tons of tobacco, and some other products.

The municipal new economic zone bureau made available the necessary capital, materials, and equipment for the construction of water conservancy projects, health stations, schools, marketing cooperative outlets, and radio stations and public address systems. Permanently resettled at the new economic centers, the resettlers could have their minds at ease to devote their efforts for both collective and family economic activities.

The Hanoi municipal people's committee has further instructed related sectors and organizations to transfer more people quickly to resettle in uncultivated areas and wastelands belonging to the districts of Ba Vi, Thach That, Me Linh, Soc Son, and the Son Tay Town, with the objectives of establishing industrial, cashew, tobacco-planting, and afforestation zones.

This year, the Thuong Tin District (Ha Son Binh) put a lot of effort into planting 3,500 hectares of winter crop, doubling the previous crop. Since the start of the 10th-month crop, the district redistributed rice seeds, transplanted over 50 percent of short-term rice varieties, and set aside approximately 3,500 hectares for an early transplanting of the CR203 rice whose harvest took place in late September and early October in order to make the land available for the winter crop. This year, the district planted 1,300 hectares of potatoes, 200 hectares of corn, 100 hectares of sweet potatoes, 30 hectares of soybeans, and 20 hectares of garlic, and the rest was used for vegetables and other secondary crops. The district mobilized 10 tractors from the district engineering and agricultural equipment enterprise, 4 other big tractors, 150 small tractors from cooperatives, 2,300 water buffaloes, and 1,712 oxen for the winter crop's earth work. Twenty-eight cooperatives in Thuong Tin participated in the winter crop and tried to plant 300 more hectares of potatoes than last year. The cooperatives made ready 4,000 tons of potato seeds, and for each hectare, they invested 1.4 tons of seeds and 270 kg of nitrogenous urea. The district is now starting to plant two new varieties of potatoes to replace the old ones, and a new technique in preparing the seed is being used: splitting the tubercle and separating the bud. The district is making an all-out effort to plant its best winter crop.

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BRIEFS

NEW CEMENT KILN—Precisely on the occasion of this year's 2 September Independence Day, Hoang Lien Son completed work on building, assembling, and putting into commission the first kiln of its three-kiln cement production line as part of a project to enlarge the Phu Thinh Cement Factory and quadruple its capacity. The project was designed, built, assembled, and installed by cadres and workers in the provincial construction sector. The effort to expand the Phu Thinh Cement Factory and increase its production capacity stemmed from an urgent need to serve local construction. One of its products, white cement, which boasts a degree of whiteness from 72 to 78 percent, has twice received a silver medal at the National Economic and Technical Fair. After putting the new kiln into service, the factory continued to assemble and install the two remaining kilns, striving to complete the entire expanded production line by November 1986. Operating an old kiln since the beginning of the year, the factory has fulfilled the plan for turning out 2,000 tons of black cement in the first 6 months and is switching to make 1,500 tons of white cement and other products including cement tiles, facing bricks, and nonbaked building bricks, in order to create more jobs for hundreds of laborers and more building materials in response to the people's need. [Text] [Hanoi NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 12 Sep 86 pp 1, 4] 9213/12851

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EUCALYPTUS PLANTING, RAW MATERIALS FOR PAPER PRODUCTION DISCUSSED

Hanoi NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 3 Oct 86 p 3

[Article by Nhat Ninh: "Raw Materials for Paper Mills from the Forests of Vinh Phu: Intensive Cultivation of White Eucalyptuses; Application of Technological Progress To Raise Output from 7 Cubic Meters Per Hectare to 20 Cubic Meters Per Hectare"]

[Text] Vinh Phu has five paper mills belonging to both the central and local governments. The annual output of these mills are 60,000 tons, except for the Bai Bang Paper Mill, whose output is 50,000 tons per year. Vinh Phu's paper output takes up half of the general output in the whole country. The annual needs in raw materials for the production of paper run between 250,000 and 300,000 tons, and the average daily need is 1,000 tons.

Therefore, the issue posed is: how can we solve the problem of supplying raw materials for those mills? In conjunction with the Vinh Phu Forestry Department, the Central Directorate of Paper and Fiber Programs has conducted a study for the intensive cultivation of white eucalyptuses in the two districts of Phong Chau and Lap Thach for this purpose.

White eucalyptuses and pine trees are two types of trees used as raw materials in the production of paper in the world nowadays. White eucalyptuses are planted extensively in our country, can adapt to almost all climatic and soil conditions, and give a yield higher than many other forest trees.

Being a midlands province with 65 percent of its natural lands covered with hills and forests, Vinh Phu chiefly focuses on planting tea and other trees serving as raw materials for paper and fiber production, and these activities are considered geared into the right direction toward prosperity. Vinh Phu has approximately 192,000 hectares of forest lands, but the actual forest area takes only 53 percent and the remainder, 80,000 hectares, consists of wastelands. With this forest capital and with the old method of cultivation, the forests of Vinh Phu are unable to meet the needs in raw materials for the paper mills. What should be done is to revert to intensive cultivation in order to increase output, make investments both in width and in depth, and apply technological progress to the production of raw materials out of the forests' offerings.

Vinh Phu has twice planted the white eucalyptus on its hills. In about 1979 and before, there was an abuse of the adaptability and the ability to withstand harsh climatic conditions of the eucalyptus, and this led to our planting the tree in any soil conditions with marginal success. For this reason, almost all eucalyptus forests developed poorly, their output was low, and worse, many parts of those forests withered. Some people then opined that large areas of eucalyptus forests exhausted the water supply and the fertile element of the soil and killed the grasslands used for animal husbandry. From then on, eucalyptus forests were slashed down, the land was left uncultivated, and the eucalyptus was virtually eliminated from the forest vegetation structure.

Experts in forest soil and vegetation then tried to answer the question: "Can the eucalyptus be planted in our country?" The answer was: "The eucalyptus can absolutely be planted in any kind of soil in our country, even in degraded soil which has lost its forest soil nature, and the only requirement is that it be sufficiently watered." Few forest trees are adaptable to so wide variety of soil and climatic conditions like the eucalyptus. This is a distinct advantage of this tree over other wide-leaf trees. According to experts in eucalyptus forests, this tree belongs to the variety having hard leaves and sparse canopies, allowing more sunlight to reach the soil surface more than wide-leaf forests do and creating low humidity. The eucalyptus grows fast and absorbs many nutritious elements and much water, and its root system is extensive and competes with the natural grass carpet. Although the trees like arid land, if the water supply is exhausted and no intensive cultivation is done, they cannot become a forest. Based on the above characteristics, forestry scientists advise against planting the tree on large and continuous areas on denuded hills with steep slopes but suggest that the tree be planted in a band pattern around hills having a 20- to 25-meter gradient or more and where the earth crust offers a fertile layer of 40-50 cm. In such conditions, it can give an annual output of 10-15 cubic meters per hectare.

On the second try, the forestry scientists of Vinh Phu planted the eucalyptus on the hills on the basis of solid scientific expertise. The tree was planted on a large scale in the framework of an afforestation program and began to yield timber, firewood, and raw materials for the production of paper and fibers. Results of recent research on the eucalyptus serve as the basis for expanding the eucalyptus forests to provide raw materials for the production of paper.

I visited the intensively cultivated eucalyptus forests in Phong Chau and Lap Thach after storms and downpours pelted and caused heavy damage to the mountainous and midland provinces of the north. The intensively cultivated eucalyptus forests had been swept by high winds, which caused some trees to be slanted or fall, but the recovery was fast. The trees had been initially planted with its young roots kept intact by a protective ball of dirt, and the forest soil had been carefully plowed, harrowed, and fertilized. With this intensive-cultivation method, the trees grew and recovered fast, and

that made a big difference and allowed them to achieve absolute superiority over the naturally planted forests whose newly planted trees, decimated by the storm, had to be re-planted and whose young trees were heavily damaged by the storm.

The Directorate of the Paper and Fiber Programs have chosen the Phong Chau District as a test site for the intensive cultivation of the white eucalyptus because the district is located near Viet Tri City where there are many paper mills and wastelands. The Forestry Directorate was assigned the job of providing guidance to the three villages of Tien Yen, Phu Loc, and Trung Hoa for the planting of the Australian white eucalyptus in the spring and fall-winter crops. Plowing was done, respectively, by mechanical plowers in flatlands, by buffaloes in slightly sloped hills, and by hand where the land is steeply sloped. The new plants were fertilized with green manure and with NPK chemical fertilizers at the proportion of 12:5:16 and planted in holes and burrows with intervals of 40 cm and 80 cm, respectively. Rows of eucalyptuses were interspersed with rows of hill cashew trees, or beans, or tephrosia candida. Where the soil is flat, the eucalyptuses were planted in grasslands with grass of the "xtylo" variety, where large domestic animals grazed and feed for small domestic animals could be obtained.

Nitrogenous fertilizers and potassium in the soil were generated by the interspersed planting of plants in the bean family and by forest vegetation refuse, not including nitrogenous fertilizers supplied by the Vietnam-Swedish cooperation program for the Bai Bang raw material zone for the production of paper. Mixtures of peat and apatite can substitute for phosphorous fertilizers. Vinh Phu has an inexhaustible source of peat, and therefore it can have enough fertilizer to afforest by intensive cultivation. Each hectare of eucalyptuses with interspersed cashews, beans, and tephrosia candida can yield 20 cubic meters of wood, 10 quintals of cashews, or 8 quintals of bean (soybeans or mung beans). Besides, this interspersed planting has the merit of retaining nitrogen in the soil, enriching it, and increasing the output of forest trees.

From Phong Chau and Lap Thach, the movement for intensive-cultivation afforestation spread to all the eight districts in the province. In 1984, only 1 district and 3 villages joined the movement; in 1985, the number grew to 4 districts, 11 villages, and 5 state-operated units; and in 1986, there were 8 districts, 28 villages, and 9 state-operated units participating. From 77 hectares of eucalyptus forests, the planting area of this tree spread to nearly 1,500 hectares. For the 1986 plan, Vinh Phu expected to plant 1,000 hectares of eucalyptuses, but in just the first 6 months of the year, it planted 1,480 hectares. The intensively cultivated eucalyptus forests developed quickly: 2-month-old trees can reach a height of 1.5 meters. With this speed, each year 20 cubic meters of materials can be exploited from each hectare (200 cubic meters per hectare for a 8-year cycle), while the naturally grown eucalyptus forests can give a yield of 7 cubic meters per hectare at best.

Vinh Phu's soil is the best for the planting of eucalyptuses in our country. It is not at random that the five paper mills were created in the "eucalyptus country." The chains of low hills in the Vinh Phu midlands with less than a 15-meter gradient offer a variety of soils formed by old silt and a network of underground water that are ideal for the eucalyptus to develop into forests. The steeply sloped and denuded hills of Phong Chau and Lap Thach also accommodate the intensively cultivated eucalyptus well. Intensive-cultivation afforestation has the merit of reforming the soil of denuded hills and of giving a high yield in afforestation.

With its present land availabilities, Vinh Phu is expanding its intensive-cultivation and semi-intensive cultivation afforestation on an area of 40,000 hectares, including 8,000 hectares of eucalyptuses, 15,000 hectares of pine trees, and 12,000 hectares of "mo" trees and pipal trees, and can supply enough paper pulp for the five local paper mills. The exploitation cycle of the eucalyptus is 8 years, with a total yield of 200 cubic meters per hectare, that of the pine tree is 15 years, with a yield of 100 cubic meters per hectare, and that of "mo" and pipal trees is 12 years, with a yield of 100 cubic meters per hectare. These figures will govern the plans for the expansion of the area of intensive-cultivation forests for paper raw materials in Vinh Phu from 1986 to 2000. If the plans are completed, the afforestation area can be reduced 15 times (equalling 615,000 hectares of natural forests for the exploitation of other forest products), and on the other hand, there will be a substantial saving of fuel and transportation means due to the shortening of transportation routes (four times less), not to mention the labor saved.

The eucalyptus forest is the first successful experiment of this type in our country. It opens a new perspective for the development of other raw material forests having natural conditions similar to the ones prevailing in Vinh Phu.

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